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
THE KARMA-MĪMĀMSĀ

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I

THE DEVELOPMENT AND LITERARY HISTORY OF THE KARMA-MIMĀMSĀ

Nor rarely in the Brāhmaṇas, especially in later texts like the *Kauṣītaki*, the term Mīmāṃsā occurs as the designation of a discussion on some point of ritual practise. The sacrifice left innumerable opportunities for divergence of usage in detail, and the texts decide in favour of one or the other alternative, on the strength of the reasons familiar to the Brāhmaṇas, in special the symbolical significance attaching to the action recommended. There is a vital difference between this form of Mīmāṃsā and that of the classical Karma-Mīmāṃsā school, in the fact that in the former the appeal to authority, and the necessity of reconciling apparent discrepancies of authority, are entirely lacking. But the tendency to surrender judgment in favour of tradition may be traced in the care with which in the *Śatapatha* and the *Kauṣītaki Brāhmaṇas* the name of the teacher is adduced in support of the doctrines expounded; in the older style the reasonings stand by themselves, commended by their intrinsic value.

The process by which the Brāhmaṇas came to be regarded as texts of incontrovertible accuracy, and speculation on the sacrifice ceased to be independent, cannot now be traced in detail. The account of the sacrifices given in these texts, supplemented by the collections of Mantras in the Samhitās of the various schools, would, obviously, never have sufficed to enable priests to carry out the sacrifices, and there must have been a full and precise oral tradition regarding the mode in which the sacrifices, which formed the subjects of the mystical speculations of the Brāhmaṇas, were to be performed. This tradition, however, in the course of time

seems to have become obscured, just as the tradition of the interpretation of the Mantras fell into confusion, and in its place in some degree supervened an attempt, on the ground of reasoning, to deduce from the Samhitās and the Brāhmaṇas, taken together, rules for the regulation of the performance of the offerings. The difficulties of such a course were considerable; there are real divergences between the Samhitās and the Brāhmaṇas, which we may justly attribute to change of ritual, but which in the opinion of the priests admitted of other explanations. Thus, in some cases, the order of the Mantras is patently different from the order of actions contemplated in the Brāhmaṇas, a divergence which the new Mīmāṃsā decided in favour of the order of the Mantras on the ground that, as they were recited in the sacrifice they were more directly connected with the sacrifice than the Brāhmaṇas, which were not immediately employed in the offering. With more plausibility, the new doctrine held that if a Brāhmaṇa mentioned an action out of its natural order, such as the cooking of the rice grains before the husking, it was nevertheless to be assumed that the normal sequence was to be followed. More legitimately still, the new science devoted itself to such problems as the determination of the person by whom the several actions enjoined, without specification of the actor, fell to be performed; the connection as principal and subordinate of the many details of the offering; and the precise mode of performance of the Vikṛtis, or derivative forms of the main sacrifices, the particulars of which are seldom adequately indicated in the sacred texts.

The antiquity of the new science is vouched for by the Dharma Sūtras. Āpastamba in two passages¹ disposes of contested points by the authority of those who know the Nyāya, a term which is the early designation of the Karma-Mīmāṃsā and persists through its history in its generic sense of "reasoning," while the Nyāya philosophy proper borrows it, and applies it more specifically to denote the syllogism. What is still more convincing is that Āpastamba

¹ Bühler, *Sacred Books of the East*, II, xxviii, xxix; XXV, xlvii, lii.

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uses arguments which are to be found in the *Mīmāṃsā Sūtra*; thus he maintains that no text can be inferred from a custom for which a secular motive is apparent, and that a revealed text has superior validity to a custom whence a text might be inferred. The corresponding rules in the *Mīmāṃsā Sūtra* (I, 3, 3-4) do not textually agree, and we may fairly conclude that at this date, probably not later than the middle of the third century B.C., the *Sūtra* did not exist in its present form, but it is plain that the science itself was in full vogue, and a *Mīmāṃsaka* appears to have been deemed a necessary member of a *Paṇḍita*. The influence of this discipline can plainly be discerned in the existing *Sūtra* texts; the works of Āśvalāyana, Śāṅkhāyana, Āpastamba, Hiranyakeśin, Lāṭyāyana, and Drāhyāyana have been composed under its influence, and the same consideration applies even to texts like those of the Baudhāyana and Mānava schools, which show greater affinities to the Brāhmaṇa style. We need not, of course, assume that the old sacrificial tradition was entirely lost, but we may be certain that it has been largely transformed in the process of remodelling.

Simultaneously with the remodelling of the *Sūtras*, there must have proceeded the definition of the rules of interpretation until they were finally codified in the *Mīmāṃsā Sūtra*,¹ which passes under the name of Jaimini, but the details of this process must remain unknown to us. What is certain is that the *Mīmāṃsā Sūtra* presupposes a long history of discussion, and that its aphorisms, which often assume, without expressing, general rules of interpretation, deal largely with difficulties affecting individual Vedic texts, which had long been the subject of dispute. This characteristic is shown clearly in the mode of discussion followed in the text; the essential subdivision is the *Adhikaraṇa*, which, according to the school, is to be deemed to fall into five parts; these Mādhava reckons as the subject of investigation (*viśaya*), the doubt (*saṁśaya*), the first or *prima facie* view (*pūrvapakṣa*), the

¹ Edited, *Bibliotheca Indica*, 1873-1889; trans. of Adhyāyas I-III, by Gaṅgānātha Jhā, *Sacred Books of the Hindus*, vol. X.

answer or demonstrated conclusion (*siddhānta*), and the relevance of the topic (*saṃgati*), but the last head is elsewhere reckoned as the third, and a more natural division¹ omits it, and regards as the fourth and fifth members the answer (*uttarapakṣa*), and the conclusion (*nirṇaya*). Thus in the first Sūtra of the text there are two Adhikaraṇas; is the study of the Veda necessary for the three upper castes, and is Dharma a proper subject of study? The latter alone needs full discussion; the reply to the former being self-evident. The subject then is formed by the two Vedic precepts, "One should study the Veda," and "One should perform the final bath after studying the Veda." The doubt is whether one should, after learning the Vedic text, perform the bath and end one's studentship, or remain longer with the teacher to study Dharma. The *prima facie* view is that the bath should follow immediately on the learning of the text, but the reply is that real study of the Veda is not satisfied by mere reading of the text, and the conclusion, therefore, is that the final bath is to be postponed for a time in order that the student may complete his learning of the text by a study of Dharma. Of all this, however, the Sūtra itself has nothing, consisting merely of the words, "Now, therefore, an enquiry into Dharma," and, though in some cases there is more full development of an Adhikaraṇa, it is to the commentators that we must look for enlightenment on the exact issues in dispute. It is not, of course, to be supposed that at any time the Sūtra was handed down without oral explanation, but, as usual, the authentic version was early obscured.

Of these Adhikaraṇas there are in the Sūtra in Mādhava's reckoning about 915, divided into twelve books with sixty Pādas, the third, sixth, and tenth having eight each in lieu of the normal four, and 2,652 aphorisms (2,742 in another reckoning). Jaimini is the chief authority cited, but mention is made also of other names, such as those of Bādari, Ātreya, and Bādarāyaṇa, who occur also in the *Vedānta Sūtra*, and of Lābukāyana, Aitaśāyana, etc. Who Jaimini was we cannot say. A Jaimini is credited with the author-

¹ Cowell in Colebrooke, *Essays* I, 326.

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ship of a *Śrauta* and a *Grhya Sūtra*, and the name occurs in lists of doubtful authenticity in the *Āśvalāyana* and *Sāṅkhāyana Grhya Sūtras*; a *Jaiminiya Saṁhitā* and a *Jaiminiya Brāhmaṇa* of the *Sāma Veda* are extant. As an authority on philosophy Jaimini appears in the *Vedānta Sūtra* and often in later works,¹ but it is significant that, while it is possible that the *Mahābhārata* recognises the existence of the *Mīmāṃsā* it does not refer to Jaimini as a philosopher, but merely as an ancient sage.² Neither Buddhist or Jain literature throws light on his personality or date, and the period of the *Sūtra* can be determined, therefore, merely on grounds of comparison of its contents with those of other works.

It is probable that the *Mīmāṃsā Sūtra* is the earliest of the six Darśanas preserved to us. The *Yoga Sūtra* is not an early work; it seems to recognise the *Vijñānavāda* school of Buddhism, which, in all probability, belongs to the fourth century A.D., and the popular identification of Patañjali with the author of the *Mahābhāṣya* is clearly untenable.³ The lateness of the *Sāṅkhya Sūtra* is admitted, and the theory that its contents include early matter has been controverted. The *Vaiśeṣika Sūtra* has no point of contact with the *Mīmāṃsā* such as would render any conclusion possible, but the *Nyāya Sūtra* (II, 1, 61) is familiar with the *Mīmāṃsā* terminology, and it is improbable that, had the *Nyāya* existed before the *Mīmāṃsā Sūtra* took form, it would have been ignored by the latter as it is. The relation to the *Vedānta Sūtra* is less clear; the mention of Jaimini and Bādarāyaṇa in both texts affords some ground for the view that the two works were simultaneously redacted, but this conclusion is by no means assured. We have no valid reason for assuming that the *Sūtras* were actually redacted by Jaimini and Bādarāyaṇa themselves,

¹ His death, caused by an elephant, is recorded in *Pañcatantra* I, 34, but not in the *Tantrākhyāyika*. The name is strange, but is ignored in Pāṇini and the *Mahābhāṣya*, which, however, knows of *Mīmāṃsakas*, probably adherents of this school (*Indische Studien*, XIII, 455, 466).

² Hopkins, *Great Epic of India*, p. 97.

³ *Sāṅkhya System*, pp. 56, 57.

and, unless this is established, the argument for contemporaneity is invalid. It is true that it is impossible to deduce from the style of the Mīmāṃsā as Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā a relation of temporal priority for Jaimini's work; the Mīmāṃsā is prior to the Vedānta because it deals with the sacred rites, the knowledge of which, in the view of one school of Vedānta, is an indispensable preliminary to the knowledge of the absolute, though Śaṅkara declines to accept this view and insists instead on the diverse character of the ends of the two disciplines, which renders it impossible to treat the former as the normal or necessary prelude to the latter.¹ Nonetheless it remains true that we must assume that the Mīmāṃsā as a science developed before the Vedānta.² The former was plainly necessitated by the development of the sacrificial ritual with which it is immediately connected, and it serves an important practical end; the latter is proof of the growth of a philosophical spirit, which sought to comprehend as a whole the extremely varied speculations which are scattered in the Āraṇyakas and Upaniṣads. While, of course, it is not impossible that the redaction of the two Sūtras was contemporaneous, despite the earlier development of the Mīmāṃsā, the probability surely lies in favour of the view that the *Mīmāṃsā Sūtra* was redacted first and served as a model for the other schools.

Even if this view is accepted, it remains difficult to assign any definite date to the Sūtra. It contains no certain reference to Buddhist tenets of any kind, for the term *buddha*, in I, 2, 33, has not this signification, and we need not with Kumārila read a reference to Buddhism into I, 3, 5, and 6. The *Vedānta Sūtra* is of uncertain date; if we believe Śaṅkara, it criticises (II, 2, 28-32) the Vijñānavāda school of Buddhism, but this doctrine is probably wrong³ and we need see only a reference to the Śūnyavāda of Nāgārjuna. The date of this school is uncertain; if we accept the opinion that it was not enunciated before Nāgārjuna in such a manner as to invite criticism in the

¹ Deussen, *Vedānta*, ch. I.

² Thibaut, *S.B.E.*, XXXIV, ix ff.

³ Jacobi, *J.A.O.S.*, XXXI, 1 ff; Keith, *J.R.A.S.*, 1914, pp. 1091 ff; see below, pp. 46, 47.

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Vedānta Sūtra, that work cannot be earlier than the third century A.D., for Āryadeva, Nāgārjuna's contemporary, refers to the zodiacal signs and the week-days, which were not known in India until that epoch. But it is possible that the Śūnyavāda, which can be recognised in Āsvaghōṣa, was of older fame than Nāgārjuna, though on the whole it is more likely than not that it was the dialectical ability of that teacher which made the doctrine the object of Vedāntic confutation. It is, then, a plausible conclusion that the *Mīmāṃsā Sūtra* does not date after 200 A.D., but that it is probably not much earlier, since otherwise it would have been natural to find in the *Mahābhārata* some reference to it and to its author.

As we have seen, the *Sūtra* must from the first have been accompanied by a comment, which in course of time was lost or became defective. The first commentator of whom we have certain knowledge is a Vṛttikāra, from whose work a long extract is made in the *Bhāṣya* of Śabarasvāmin on *Mīmāṃsā Sūtra*, I, 1, 5, in which the author attacks and refutes Buddhist views. If we believe Kumārila, the discussion is directed in part against the Vijñānavāda school, in part against the Śūnyavāda, but in this case we have every reason to distrust his assertion, for, plainly by error, he ascribes the major portion of the discussion to Śabarasvāmin, and not to the Vṛttikāra. It is, therefore, not improbable that he is also in error in finding any reference to the Vijñānavāda, for the passage seems to deal with one topic only, and that the Śūnyavāda. It follows, accordingly, that the date of the Vṛttikāra was probably not later than the fourth century A.D., since, had he lived later, he would hardly have omitted an explicit discussion of the tenets of the idealistic school of Buddhism.

The name of the Vṛttikāra is uncertain. The conjecture¹ that he was Bhavadāsa, mentioned in one place by Kumārila, may be dismissed as wholly without support. The current opinion makes him to be Upavarṣa, who, we know from Śaṅkara (*Vedānta Sūtra*, III, 3, 53) wrote on both the texts. To this the objection has been brought that in the passage cited

¹ Gaṅgānātha Jhā, trans. of *Ślokarārttika*, p. 116.

from the Vṛttikāra by Śabarasvāmin there is a reference to Upavaṛṣa with the epithet Bhagavat, implying that he was in the eyes of the Vṛttikāra an author of venerable authority. It is probable, however, that the citation from the Vṛttikāra is only a résumé,¹ not a verbatim quotation, and that Śabarasvāmin is responsible for the reference¹ to Upavaṛṣa, the Vṛttikāra's proper name, and for this view support may be derived from the mode in which the Vṛttikāra and Upavaṛṣa are referred to by Kumārila elsewhere (II, 3, 16). If this view is rejected, it is possible that he is Bodhāyana, who certainly wrote on the *Vedānta Sūtra*, but this theory is a bare and unnecessary conjecture, seeing that Bodhāyana nowhere else appears as a Mīmāṃsā authority. Of other, presumably early, commentators we hear of Bhartṛmītra² and Hari,³ but there is no reason to identify either of these with the Vṛttikāra.

The extract from the Vṛttikāra proves that an important addition has been made to the teaching of the Mīmāṃsā in the shape of the introduction of discussions of the validity of knowledge and its diverse forms. The Sūtra itself is content with the denial of the validity of perception for the purpose of the knowledge of Dharma, and the exaltation of Vedic injunctions as the source of the necessary knowledge; under the influence, perhaps, of the Nyāya the earlier doctrine is now elaborated into a critical examination of the nature of evidence, its validity, and the forms of proof. It is not illegitimate to assume that the Vṛttikāra indulged also in metaphysical discussions; at any rate Śabarasvāmin enters into a long discussion of the nature of soul, despite his predilection for brevity in treatment of the Sūtra. The Mīmāṃsā therefore by this time enters into the whole field of philosophy, while maintaining its primary duty of expounding the rules by which the ritual can be reconstructed from the Brāhmaṇas and the Saṃhitās.

¹ In II, 3, 16, he clearly describes the Vṛttikāra as *bhagavān ācāryah*; cf. III, 1, 6. These passages Jacobi has overlooked.

² Pārthasārathi on *Ślokaṇvṛtti*, p. 4 (v. 10); he is cited on the origin of sound, *Nyāyamañjarī*, p. 213.

³ *Sāstradīpikā*, X, 2, 59, 60.

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Of Śābarasvāmin, whose commentary forms the starting point for later discussion, we know practically nothing. It is an idle fiction which makes him the father of the mythical founder of the Vikrama era (57 B.C.), of Bhartṛhari, and Varāhamihira, his true name being Ādityadeva, while he adopted the soubriquet Śābara, when he disguised himself as a forester to avoid Jain persecution. The form of his name and his relation to the Vṛttikāra suggest that 400 A.D. is the earliest date to which he can be assigned; the later limit is vaguely indicated by his priority to Prabhākara, Kumārila, and Saṃkara.

With Prabhākara and Kumārila there comes a sharp divergence in the unity of the teaching of the school, whose followers henceforth are divided between the adherents of Prabhākara, or the Guru par excellence, and the supporters of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa. It does not, however, appear that Prabhākara initiated the views which he became noted for expounding; he cites in the *Bṛhatī*, his 'great' exposition of Śābarasvāmin's *Bhāṣya*, the opinions of a Vārttikakāra who presumably must be regarded as the true founder of the school. The *Bṛhatī* itself is unfortunately only extant in imperfect form;¹ it was commented on by Śālikanātha in his *Rjuvimalā*, formerly erroneously regarded as simply a commentary on the *Śābarabhāṣya*, while in his *Prakaraṇapañcikā*² the same author deals with the more important epistemological and metaphysical views of his teacher. The *Bṛhatī* seems to have passed comparatively early into oblivion, though a passage from it is cited in the *Mitākṣarā* and its author's views were well known in Mīmāṃsā circles.

The relation of Prabhākara and Kumārila is represented by tradition as those of pupil and teacher; the tradition is fairly old, as it occurs in the *Sarvasiddhāntasaṃgraha* (I, 18, 19; VII, 15) attributed, doubtless wrongly, to Saṃkara himself. But the discovery of the text of the

¹ See Gaṅgānātha Jhā, *The Prabhākara School of Pūrva Mīmāṃsā* (1911).

² Ed. Benares, 1903-04; the text is defective, and the *Prameyapārāyana* is lacking. He uses Uddyotakara (e.g. p. 44) and Dharmakīrti, and therefore is not before 650-700 A.D., but is probably before Kumārila. Prabhākara thus dates about 600-650 A.D.

Brhatī has enabled us to correct this error. Prabhākara follows Śabarasvāmin closely; he does not refute the opinions of Kumārila; in one passage (IV, 1, 2), when he does criticise an opinion of the latter, the form of words used by him in adducing it differs entirely from those in which the view of Kumārila is expressed, showing clearly that he is dealing with some older author, whom Kumārila has followed. On the other hand, Kumārila frequently diverges from the views of the *Bhāṣya*; he criticises (I, 2, 31; 3, 2; 4, 1) views which are expressed by Prabhākara, and asserts independent views. There is a clear difference of style between the two authors; Prabhākara is comparatively simple, vivid and direct like Śabarasvāmin; he seldom uses long compounds; he avoids the combination of various reasonings in a single clause; in lieu of the formal terminology of objection and reply (*nanu . . . ced, na or syād etat . . . tad ayuktam*) he adopts the form of question and answer, which, however, has the disadvantage of leaving at times the meaning in doubt. In all these aspects Kumārila shows a richer, more varied, and elaborated style, which is reminiscent of the *Sārīrakabhāṣya* of Śaṅkara.

Kumārila's great exposition of the *Śabarahāṣya* falls into three parts, the first, the *Ślokavārttika*,¹ in verse, deals with Pāda I of Adhyāya I of the *Bhāṣya*, and is of the greatest value as an explanation of the metaphysics and epistemology of his system. The second, the *Tantravārttika*,² covers the remaining three Pādas of Adhyāya I and the whole of Adhyāyas II and III. The third part, the *Tuṭṭikā*, consists merely of scattered notes on the last nine Adhyāyas. Each part has been commented on; the first by Pārthasārathi Miśra in his *Nyāyaratnākara*, and by Sucarita Miśra in his *Kāśikā*; the second by Someśvara, son of Mahādeva, in his *Nyāyasudhā* or *Rāṇaka*; the third by Veṅkaṭeśvara Dikṣita in his *Vārttikābharāṇa*. Kumārila's date is determinable within definite limits;³ he used the

¹ Ed. Benares, 1898-99; trans. Gaṅgānātha Jhā, *Bibliotheca Indica*, 1900-8.

² Ed Benares, 1890; trans. Gaṅgānātha Jhā, *Bibliotheca Indica*, 1903-20.

³ Pathak, *J.B.R.A.S.* XVIII, 213 ff.

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Vākyapadīya of Bhartṛhari; neither Hiuen-Thsang nor I-tsing mentions him; he was before Śaṅkara; he attacked the Jain theory of an omniscient being as propounded in the *Āptamīmāṃsā* of Samantabhadra, but is not answered by Akalaṅka in his *Aṣṭaśatī*, which comments on the *Āptamīmāṃsā*. On the other hand, he is freely attacked by Vidyānanda and Prabhācandra, who both lived before 838 A.D. Vidyānanda assures us, doubtless correctly, that he criticised the Buddhist Dharmakīrti, and Prabhākara, on the latter point agreeing with the result above arrived from internal evidence. The upper limit of date is, therefore, not earlier than 700 A.D. The lower limit depends on his precise chronological relation to Śaṅkara and the latter's exact date. Later tradition, the *Śaṅkaravijayas* of Mādhava and the pseudo-Ānandagiri, would make him an older contemporary, but the interval may have been considerably longer.

Only slightly later than Kumārila was Maṇḍana Miśra, author of the *Vidhiviveka*, a treatise on the significance of injunctions, and the *Mīmāṃsānukramaṇī*, a summary of Śabarasvāmin's *Bhāṣya*. The tradition of the *Śaṅkaravijayas* makes him out to be identical with Sureśvara, a pupil of Śaṅkara, but Ānandagiri's account insists that he was also a pupil of Kumārila. The identification with Sureśvara, which might be suspected because of the lateness and inferior character of the authorities, is to some extent confirmed by Vidyānanda's description¹ of Maṇḍana Miśra as Vedāntavādin, which could hardly apply to him unless he were the author of the works ascribed to Sureśvara. His direct connection with Kumārila, however, need not be insisted upon. His lower limit of date is fixed by the fact that the famous Vācaspati Miśra devoted the *Nyāyakaṇikā* to the exposition of his *Vidhiviveka*,² and Vācaspati probably lived about 850 A.D. He wrote also the *Tattvabindu*³ on Kumārila's views.

Of the later writers the most important is perhaps Pārthasārathi Miśra, who wrote the *Śāstradīpikā*⁴ to explain

¹ *Ibid.* p. 228.

² Ed. *Pandit*, XXV-XXVIII, 1903-6.

³ Ed. Benares, 1892.

⁴ Ed. Benares, 1891. He is earlier than Mādhava.

the Sūtra; on it commented, in 1543 A.D., Rāmakṛṣṇa Bhaṭṭa, son of Mādhava, in the *Yuktisnehaprapuraṇi*, Somanātha, son of Sūra Bhaṭṭa, an Āndhra Brahman of the Nittal family, in his *Mayūkhamālikā*, Vaidyanātha (1710 A.D.), Bhaṭṭa Śaṅkara, Bhaṭṭa Dinakara, Kamalākara, and others. His *Tantrarātna* comments on points in the last nine Adhyāyas of the Sūtra and the *Bhāṣya*, while his *Nyāyaratnamālā*¹ is an independent treatise on which Rāmānuja, apparently the great Vedantist, has written a comment, the *Nāyakarātna*.

Much later in date is Khaṇḍadeva, who died at Benares in 1665 A.D. His works, the *Bhāṭṭadīpikā*, and on a larger scale the *Mīmāṃsākaustubha*,² deal fully with the Sūtra; the former was commented on in 1708 by his pupil Śambhu Bhaṭṭa. Value attaches also to the *Mīmāṃsāsūtradidhiti* or *Nyāyāvalīdidhiti* of Rāghavānanda Sarasvatī, pupil of Advaya, pupil of Viśveśvara, and to the *Mīmāṃsānaya-viveka* of Bhavanātha Miśra, which deals also with Śabara-svāmin. Yet other commentaries are recorded, including works by Mahādeva Vedāntin, Kamalākara and Vaidyanātha, son of Rāmacandra, the *Subodhinī*³ of Rāmeśvara Sūri, the *Bhāṭṭacintāmaṇi* of Viśveśvara or Gāgā Bhaṭṭa, etc.

Apart from the Sūtra there was developed a considerable literature which aims, as did Maṇḍana Miśra, at dealing systematically with the doctrines of the school. First in importance, perhaps, is the *Jaiminīyanyāyamālāvīstara*⁴ of the famous Mādhava written in the fourteenth century, which, however, is merely a summary in verse, with a prose comment, of the *Mīmāṃsā Sūtra*. At the end of the sixteenth century Appayya Dikṣita wrote his *Vidhīrasāyana*,⁵ a disquisition on the nature of injunction, adding himself a commentary, the *Sukhopayojinī*. This text was refuted by Gopāla Bhaṭṭa in his *Vidhīrasāyanabhūṣaṇa*, and by Śaṅkara Bhaṭṭa in his *Vidhīrasāyanadūṣaṇa*. The same author, who was of the same period as Appayya, wrote

¹ Ed. Benares, 1900.

² Ed. Conjeveram, 1902 (I, 2 only). The *Dīpikā* is ed. in the *Bibliotheca Indica*.

³ Ed. Pāṇḍit, XVII-XXI.

⁴ Ed. London, 1878.

⁵ Ed. Benares 1901.

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a commentary on the *Śāstradīpikā*, and the *Mīmāṃsāsāra-saṃgraha*,¹ in which he enumerates 1,000 Adhikaraṇas, allotting to each a quarter verse. An extended version of this work forms his *Mīmāṃsābālāprakāśa*,² on which there is a commentary by Keśava, son of Viśvanātha. Appayya himself wrote also the *Upakramaparākrama*, a treatise on the comparative importance of the commencement and end of a continuous Vedic passage.

The most popular introduction to the Mīmāṃsā is probably the *Mīmāṃsānyāyaprakāśa*³ of Āpadeva, son of Anantadeva, and pupil of Govinda. His date is determined by the fact that his son, Anantadeva, wrote his *Smṛtikauṣṭubha* under a prince who lived in the middle of the seventeenth century. Anantadeva commented on his father's work in the *Bhāṭṭālamkāra*, and his brother, Jivadeva, discussed in the *Bhāṭṭabhāskara* the divergent views prevalent in the schools. Even better known, perhaps, is the *Arthasaṃgraha*⁴ of Laugākṣi Bhāskara, which seems to be based in part on the work of Āpadeva, and, if so, must belong to the seventeenth century. This date would suit adequately the probable period of his popular Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika treatise, the *Tarkakaumudī*. Another short text is the *Mīmāṃsāparibhāṣā*⁵ of Kṛṣṇa Dīkṣita, and the *Mīmāṃsāratna* of Raghunātha, who uses the *Kāśikā*, contains some information of value on the views of the opposing schools. Nārāyaṇatīrtha Muni's *Bhāṭṭabhāṣāprakāśa*⁶ is an exposition of the terminology of the Mīmāṃsā, while Rāmakṛṣṇa Udīcya Bhāṭṭācārya's *Adhikaraṇakau-mudī*⁷ expounds a selection of interesting Adhikaraṇas. Khaṇḍadeva's *Bhāṭṭarāhasya*⁸ deals with the mode of determining which is the leading word in a text under discussion. More interesting is the fact that the famous Vallabha Ācārya is credited with a *Pūrvamīmāṃsāskārikā*, an epitome in 42 verses of Jaimini's views, written with reference to the doctrine of faith which Vallabha expounded,

¹ Ed. Benares, 1904. ² Ed. Benares, 1902.

³ Ed. Calcutta, 1901; Benares, 1905.

⁴ Ed. and trans. Thibaut, Benares, 1882.

⁵ Ed. Benares, 1904. ⁶ Ed. Benares, 1900.

⁷ Ed. Calcutta, 1885. ⁸ Ed. Conjeeveram, 1900.

and a *Jaiminisūtrabhāṣya* which deals with the first chapter of the second book of the Sūtra. The well-known scholar, Veṅkaṭanātha Vedāntācārya, in his *Mīmāṃsāpādukā*,¹ in verse, discusses the Adhikaraṇas in the first chapter of the first book of the Sūtra, and in his *Seṣvarāmīmāṃsā* seeks to combine the Mīmāṃsā with the Vedānta. Another writer from southern India, Veṅkaṭādhvarin, deals with the threefold classification of injunctions in his *Vidhitrayaparitrāṇa*, while in his *Mīmāṃsāmakaranda* he discusses the authoritative character of Arthavādas. Nārāyaṇa of Kerala, the well-known author of the *Nārāyaṇīya*, who flourished at the end of the sixteenth century, gives in the first part of the *Mānameyodaya*² an account of Kumārila's views on the nature of proof; he purposed completing his task by adding an account of the same author's views on the world of reality, but this part of his work was never carried out, and was supplied at a later date by another Nārāyaṇa, who was patronised by Mānadeva, king of Śailābdi; the work is interesting as showing how far the school of Kumārila went in appropriating the views of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophy.

Of the other systems it is the Nyāya, and later the combined school of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, which throws the most light on the Mīmāṃsā. The *Nyāya Sūtra* deals critically with the Mīmāṃsā doctrine of the eternity of the word, and Kumārila and Prabhākara³ alike appear to have developed their philosophical tenets under the influence of the controversy on logic which took place between the Nyāya school and the Buddhists, especially Dignāga and Dharmakīrti on the other hand; Kumārila attacked both of these writers and was clearly aware of the *Nyāyavārttika* of Uddyotakara, in which the orthodox Nyāya view was set out in refutation of Dignāga's onslaughts. On the other hand, the Mīmāṃsā views are freely disputed in Vācaspati Miśra's comment on Uddyotakara and in Jayanta Bhaṭṭa's *Nyāyamañjarī*, Varadarāja's *Tārkikaraksā*, and Udayana's works, much of the *Kusumāñjali* being expressly devoted to dealing with Mīmāṃsā criticisms of the doctrine of the creation of the

¹ Ed. Conjeeveram, 1900.

² Ed. Trivandrum, 1912.

³ *Prakāśanapāñcikā*, pp. 47, 64, discusses Dharmakīrti's views of perception and inference.

world. The *Tattvacintāmaṇi* of Gaṅgeśa repeatedly attacks the Mīmāṃsā views of the nature and validity of proof, and the controversy is continued in the voluminous literature based on that important text, and in the short text-books of the combined school of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. In his commentary on Praśastapāda's *Bhāṣya* Śrīdhara, from the point of view of the Vaiśeṣika deals freely with Mīmāṃsā views; moreover, the Jain Haribhadra (ninth century) includes in his *Śaddarśana-samuccaya*, commented on by Guṇaratna, an account of the Mīmāṃsā, and there are chapters upon it in the *Sarvasiddhāntasamgraha*, falsely ascribed to Saṃkara, and in Mādhava's *Sarvadarśanasamgraha*. The former work deals separately with the doctrines of Prabhākara and Kumārila; it betrays its late character by its attempt to show that Prabhākara was the pupil of Kumārila, and by converting the doctrine of Kumārila into a form of the Vedānta. The work of Mādhava gives a long specimen of the conflicting views of the two schools as to the interpretation of the opening of the Sūtra, and contains an interesting exposition of the arguments for and against the eternity of the Veda, and the self-evidence of cognition.

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa's work¹ is of special interest, as it is the product of a member of a family skilled in the Mīmāṃsā, and its author freely attacks Prabhākara and his followers, and repeatedly cites the *Śloka-vārttika*. The author's grandfather was confirmed in his faith in the efficacy of sacrifice by obtaining as the result of one offering the village of Gauramūlaka, doubtless from a king of Kashmir, for Jayanta's great-grandfather, Śaktisvāmin, was a minister of Mukṭāpīḍa, better known as Lalitāditya. Incidentally Jayanta affords a welcome confirmation of the date of Vācaspati Miśra, whom he quotes (pp. 120, 312), "for, as Lalitāditya's reign ended about 753 A.D., it is impossible to place Jayanta later than the second half of the ninth century, and hence the disputed era of the year 898 given by Vācaspati himself as the date of his *Nyāyasūci*

¹ Ed. Benares, 1895. His quotation from Vācaspati on Sūtra II, 1, 32, is found at p. 312. His son, Abhinanda, wrote the *Kādambarika-thāsāra* and lived c. 900 A.D.; Thomas, *Kavindravacanasaṃuccaya* p. 20.

must be taken as falling in the Sāṃvat reckoning as 841 A.D. This date, it may be added, tells strongly against any effort to bring down the date of Śaṅkara,¹ on whose *Śārirakabhāṣya* Vācaspati wrote the *Bhāmātī*, and the same conclusion is favoured by the view that Maṇḍana Mīśra, on whose work Vācaspati also commented, was a pupil of Śaṅkara.

Varadarāja also claims, with obvious truth, to have been an expert in Mīmāṃsā;² he was evidently familiar with Śālikanātha's work, and his commentator fortunately preserves for us a fragment of the *Prameyapārāyaṇa* chapter of the *Prakaranapañcikā*, no MS. of which has yet been discovered, which gives an authentic list of Prabhākara's categories.

¹ S. V. Venkateswara (*J.R.A.S.*, 1916, pp. 151-62) ignores this evidence in giving Śaṅkara's date as 805-897 A.D. He cannot have died later than 825 A.D. or so.

² Ed. Benares, 1903, p. 364.

II

THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE

LIKE the Nyāya, the doctrine of Prabhākara and Kumārila accepts a distinction between valid and invalid knowledge, but the basis of the distinction is different in the two cases, and the ground on which validity is asserted is also diverse. To the Mīmāṃsā apprehension (*anubhūti*) is intrinsically valid, while remembrance (*smṛti*) is intrinsically invalid, since it rests on a previous impression; the Nyāya equally disregards remembrance, but it does not accept the intrinsic validity of self-evidence (*svataḥpramānya*) of apprehension; apprehensions may be valid (*pramā*) or invalid (*apramā*), the proof being given *ab extra*. Remembrance both schools distinguish from recognition (*pratyabhijñā*), which is not regarded as depending solely on a previous mental impression, and therefore is exempt from the fatal defect of remembrance.

The intrinsic validity of apprehension is a cardinal doctrine of the Mīmāṃsā and Kumārila¹ defends it at length against the obvious objections to which it is exposed. It is impossible, it is argued, for apprehension to possess the opposing characteristics of validity and non-validity as part of its nature; nor can the validity or non-validity of apprehension depend on the ascertainment of the perfection or defect of the cause of the apprehension, since this would imply that, prior to such ascertainment, apprehension was devoid of character of its own. To assume that some cases of apprehension are intrinsically valid, and other intrinsically invalid, is open to the objection that the criterion

¹ *Śloka-vārttika*, I, 1, 2, vv. 21 ff; *Śāstra-dīpikā*, pp. 15, 31; *Mānamayodaya*, pp. 1-4, 74-78; cf. *Nyāyamañjarī*, pp. 160-80; *Tārkaṅkya* pp. 19 ff.

between the two sets of instances can only be supplied by reference to an external factor, which is fatal to the belief in intrinsic validity or the reverse. Therefore, the Nyāya argues, it is best to accept the doctrine that apprehension or cognition is intrinsically unauthoritative and its authoritativeness in any special case is derived from the perfection of the cause of the apprehension. This doctrine, it is pointed out, explains the case of dream consciousness; it is invalid because there is no perfection in its cause, while the waking consciousness may be valid if it is due to a perfect source; if, however, the source is vitiated, when the sense organs are defective, the apprehension is doubtful or erroneous, while in the case of non-apprehension there is no defect in the cause, but absence of cause.

The reply of Kumārila is that, if apprehension were not in itself valid, it could not be made so by any external power. Apprehension needs, indeed, an originating cause, but it does not depend on any external cause for its power of ascertaining the true nature of things. The conclusive argument is that, if the validity of a cognition is deemed dependent on the perfection of its source, then there must be another cognition to guarantee the correctness of the source, and so *ad infinitum*, and such a process is illegitimate, at least in the eyes of Kumārila, who does not appreciate the possibility of regarding truth as a complete system, in which all parts are dependent on one another, and there is no simple primary truth. All cases of apprehension, therefore, are *prima facie* valid, and, if cognitions are erroneous or doubtful, that is, due to defects in their causes, while non-apprehension is due to the absence of any cause, as on the Nyāya theory, with which Kumārila agrees in this regard.

The recognition of the non-validity of an apprehension establishes itself most simply when a subsequent cognition sublates an earlier cognition, for instance, when the erroneous judgment, "This is silver," is supplanted by the correct judgment, "This is mother-of-pearl." More indirectly the former judgment can be sublated by another judgment, based on the recognition of the defect of the cause; thus the proposition, "The shell is yellow," may be sublated by the further judgment, "The eye is jaundiced."

Normally, however, a judgment is valid, and is accepted as valid without question; only if, for any reason, such as distance, doubt is possible, are further cognitions sought; if then a sublating cognition is found, and on further investigation it is not sublated either directly or indirectly, then the falsity of the first cognition appears; if, on the other hand, the sublating cognition is itself sublated, the validity of the first cognition is fully established. Thus, in lieu of the *regressus in infinitum* of the Nyāya theory, no more than three or four cognitions are necessary to establish the validity of any cognition, or, to put it more precisely, to negate the objections which may be adduced to impair its normal validity.

Prabhākara¹ similarly maintains the validity of all cognitions as such, and illustrates, in an interesting manner, the diverse modes in which apparent non-validity arises. When mother-of-pearl is mistaken for silver, the error is due to the fact that the percipient observes in the object presented to him the qualities common to the shell and the silver, and omits to notice those which differentiates the two; memory thus brings back to him the cognition of silver, and this cognition is itself real, leading no less than the actual perception of silver to the normal action of seeking to take up the object. Memory here plays the percipient false, for it does not present the silver as connected with something formerly perceived, thus differentiating it from the object actually before the eyes, and this failure is due to a certain weakness of the mind. Similarly, memory is to blame when we mistake one direction for another; the real direction is not seen, and the wrong is remembered. In the dream-state the cognitions which arise are erroneous, in as much as the things seen seem to be directly apprehended, whereas they are only remembered. The factor of apprehension on a previous occasion is lost sight of, thus obliterating the essential distinction between what is apprehended and what is remembered. The presentation of impressions in sleep is

¹ *Prakaranapañcikā*, pp. 32-38; *Bhandarkar Commemoration Volume*, pp. 167-70.

due to the operation of the unseen principle, that is the destiny begotten of man's previous acts, which thus secures to man pleasure or pain in due course.

In other cases the explanation rests, not on the intervention of memory, but on fusion of impressions. Thus the white shell appears as yellow as a result of jaundice, the cognition being a blend of the shell perceived without colour, and the yellowness of the bile in the eye, perceived without its substratum. So the bilious man feels sugar bitter, because his taste is a blend of the sugar and bile. The vision of two moons is due to a lack of co-ordination of the rays of light which issue from the eyes and bring back the images.

In the case of merely doubtful cognitions the explanation of their character is that some object is seen as possessed of a quality which produces two discrepant remembrances; thus, seen at a distance a tall object may be either a pillar, or an ascetic buried in meditation and motionless.

As the Mīmāṃsā differs from the Nyāya in its view of the validity of cognitions, so it differs in its attitude to the mode in which a cognition itself is apprehended. In the Nyāya view this is an act of mental perception (*mānasapratyakṣa*), and the Vijñānavāda school of Buddhism holds the opinion that one cognition is known by another, though, going further than the Nyāya, it draws the conclusion that, if the first cognition is to be apprehended by the second, it must have form, and form therefore does not belong to any external reality, as the Nyāya holds. The Mīmāṃsā as early as the Vṛttikāra¹ maintains that in apprehension it is the object that is perceived, not the cognition (*arthaviṣayā hi pratyakṣabuddhiḥ, na buddhiviṣayā*). As expounded by Prahākara, consciousness (*samvit*), which is self-illuminated, is cognised, but not as an object of cognition, but as cognition (*samvittayaiva hi samvit samvedyā, na samvedyatayā*). To say that the cognition is unknown is absurd, since the cognition of things is possible only if the cognition is known. The mode in which cognition is known is inference; in inference we grasp the existence of a thing only, not its

¹ *Mīmāṃsā Sūtra*, p. 9, l. 16; cf. *Prakaranapañcikā*, pp. 56-63; *Śaddarśanasamuccaya*, pp. 289, 290.

concrete form; we learn the presence of fire on the mountain from its smoke, but we do not see the actual form of the fire. Cognition, therefore, we infer from the fact that we know things; it, therefore, may be classed as an object of proof (*prameya*), since it is arrived at by the use of inference, which is a means of proof (*pramāṇa*), but it is not an object of direct apprehension. In Kumārila's doctrine¹ also this view appears, though the doctrine of self-illumination is rejected; the perception of any object does not result in a further cognition of the perception, but in the direct apprehension of the object, and every act of perception involves a relation (*sambandha*) between the self and the object; this relation implies action on the part of the self as agent, and this action constitutes the cognition, which is inferred from the relationship between the self and the object.

From this point of view it is possible to understand the definition of the valid apprehension given by Pārthasārathi Miśra as that which, being free from discrepancies, apprehends things not previously apprehended.² This definition does not really derogate from the principle of the self-evidence of cognitions; the qualification of freedom from discrepancies merely lays stress on the fact that it is the absence of a sublating cognition which assures us in case of question of the validity of a cognition, while the condition that the thing in question should not have been previously apprehended is not a new factor, but merely a formal expression of the essential nature of apprehension. The exact process of cognition as explained in the *Siddhāntamuktāvalī*³ consists in the production in the object of the quality of being cognised (*jñātatā*), and, however often we cognise the same object, nevertheless in each instance the quality in question is generated anew.

The precise character of the doctrine was, it is clear, largely determined by the desire to avoid the difficulty of

¹ Cf. *Śāstradīpikā*, p. 37; *Mānameyodaya*, p. 103; *Tārikikarakṣā*, pp. 39 ff.

² *Śāstradīpikā*, p. 28.

³ P. 118; cf. *Kusumāñjali*, IV 1.

the infinite regress, which seemed to be involved in the theory that a cognition could only be known through the instrumentality of another cognition, and perhaps still more by the aim of avoiding the conclusion, which was derived from this doctrine by the Idealist school of Buddhism, that there existed no self, but merely a series of cognitions, held together by no substantial unity. To the Mīmāṃsā such a doctrine was naturally anathema, since the essence of the sacrificial ritual lay in the fact that there was a self who could profit by the performance of sacrifices, not merely in this world but after death. It might have been hard to convince men that sacrifices were worth performing, if the only reward held out had been success in this life, for facts would too often have controverted the claim that sacrifices were availing; when the reward was predicted for the next world, the issue was removed from empirical verification. But the denial of the possibility of introspection thus necessitated was obviously a real difficulty, and rendered the Mīmāṃsā view less plausible than that of the Nyāya, which accepted cognition (*vyavasāya*) and as supervening upon it consciousness of cognition (*anuvyavasāya*). The disadvantage of the Nyāya view was that it tended to ignore the fact, which was strongly emphasised in the Mīmāṃsā, of the necessary implication of the subject in all cognition. The distinction between the cognition and the subject, which possesses it, is illustrated clearly in the case of sleep; in it, the school holds, there is no cognition normally, and apparently no cogniser or object of cognition, yet the existence of both, despite sleep, is proved by the fact of remembrance of dreams. The knowing subject, therefore, is not, like the cognition, self-illuminated, though as to its exact character Prābhākara and Kumārila are far from agreed.

Of forms of apprehension or cognition Prābhākara recognises five: perception, inference, analogy, scripture or verbal testimony, and presumption; while Kumārila accepts also non-perception or negation, in accordance with the view of the Vṛttikāra, who thus supplements the bare mention of perception in the Sūtra (I, 1, 4), where it is defined as the contact of the sense organs with the object, which must be actually present. The analysis of perception given by

Prabhākara shows on every hand clear trace of derivation from the views of the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika, which again are ultimately based on popular psychology, such as appears fitfully in the Upaniṣads and in Buddhist texts. The essential feature is contact between the object and the organ of sense, which is essentially something real; but the unity of consciousness makes it clear that there must be a further contact between the organ and the self, whether directly or mediately. The fact that, despite the presence of objects in contact with the senses, there may be no cognition of them, proves that the contact cannot be direct, but must be mediated by an instrumentality called mind. It is this which prevents all facts being always and at once present to the self, and it is this which perceives pleasure and pain and brings them home to the self. It is through the mind also that the self experiences desire, aversion, and volition. But mind has no qualities, such as colour, smell or taste, and therefore for the cognition of colour it needs the aid of an organ which possesses that quality, namely, the eye, which to possess colour as its distinctive quality must be possessed of light; similarly there must be the nose, composed of earth, for the cognition of smell; the tongue, composed of water, for the cognition of savours; the skin, the organ of air, for the cognition of touch; and the ear, consisting of the ether, for the cognition of sound; the organs themselves being imperceptible.

This doctrine, of course, rests on metaphysical grounds and assumes in its treatment of the organs the doctrine that like must be known by like. The deduction of the existence and atomic size of mind by Prabhākara rests on the basis of a doctrine of causation¹ which is different from, but allied to, that of the Nyāya, and which is applied to explain the partial and evanescent characteristics of our experience. Causes are either material or immaterial, the latter head covering all the circumstances which, in conjunction with a material cause, result in an effect. The immaterial or non-inherent cause may subsist either in the

¹ *Prakaraṇapāñcikā*, pp. 52-54; cf. *Śloka-vārttika*, I, 1, 4, vv. 157 ff.

material or inherent cause, or in the material cause of that cause; thus, when by contact with the fire smell is generated in a substance, the immaterial cause is the contact with the fire, and the contact subsists in the substance itself, while, in the case of the colour of a mat, the colours of the yarns which cause the colour of the mat subsist in the yarns, which are the material cause of the mat. In the case of perception the soul is the material cause, and, as the soul is uncaused, the immaterial cause must subsist in it; in a substance, like the soul, only a quality can subsist, and therefore the immaterial cause of perception must be a quality of the soul, and this can only be some contact with an independent substance, just as the colour of the earth atom is produced by contact with fire. This independent substance cannot be all-pervading like space or time, contact with which is from their nature as all-pervading out of the question; it must therefore be atomic, and the only substance which fulfils the necessary condition is mind, residing in the body ensouled by the self, and possessing the power of swift motion, by which it can form a rapid series of contacts, giving the appearance of simultaneity in our mental life. The deduction is ingenious, but unconvincing; it is significant of the consciousness of the gap between the self and the body, which it seeks to bridge by the mediation of the atomic and therefore corporeal, but yet eternal substance, mind.

Of greater philosophical significance is the attitude of the school to the vexed question of the nature of perception as determinate or indeterminate (*savikalpaka* or *nirvikalpaka*). The *Nyāya Sūtra* (I, 1, 4) poses the problem in its famous definition of perception as knowledge produced by the contact of the sense organ and the object, consisting of a determination which does not require definition by name (*avyapadeśya*) and is not discrepant (*avyabhicāri*). The precise of this declaration is far from certain, as the ambiguities of the commentators, Vātsyāyana, Uddyotakara, and Vācaspati Miśra, clearly show, but Dignāga and Dharmakīrti developed a perfectly definite theory in which a clear distinction was drawn between the element of sense in perception and the function of imagination. In the narrowest sense perception is without imagination

and is unerring (*kalpanāpodham abhrāntam*), but this merely gives us a momentary contact with something real, but utterly inexpressible, the momentary unit of experience. All our knowledge is based on this contact, but its content is supplied by the imagination (*vikalpa*), acting by rules which it itself imposes, a conception which has obvious analogues with the Kantian doctrine of perception.¹ Dignāga's view did not prevail, but the problem had been brought by his efforts into clear light, and the later Nyāya seeks in various ways to explain the mutual relations of the indeterminate and determinate forms of perception. Kumārila² happily expresses the primitive form of perception as bare observation (*ālocana*) pertaining to the object pure and simple, and resembling the cognitions that a newborn child has of its environment. Prabhākara's doctrine³ is that the indeterminate perception apprehends both the class character and the specific individuality of the object, but, inasmuch as neither class character, nor individuality can be fully realised save by comparison, the first apprehension, since it is made without such comparison, is indeterminate in character. Determinate perception arises when the self determines the perception by recalling both these things which it resembles and those from which it differs, thus recognising both its class character and its specific individuality. The part played by memory in the determinate perception suggests that it must be deemed as invalid, since the theory of error adopted by Prabhākara finds the source of mistake constantly in the intervention of memory. But Prabhākara does not accept this objection as applicable to his own view of perception, and it may be argued that the action of memory in this case does not apply to the perception, but to the things which agree with, or differ from, the object perceived. There does not appear to be any very real difference between the view of Prabhākara and that of

¹ T. von Stcherbatskoi, *Muséon*, 1904, pp. 129 ff; Keith, *Logic and Atomism*, pt. II, ch. ii; *Saddarśanasamuccaya*, pp. 33-41.

² *Ślokarvārttika*, I, 1, 4, vv. 111 ff; *Mānameyodaya*, pp. 8-10. The determinate form adds specification as substance, class, quality, motion, or name; cf. *Nyāyamañjarī*, pp. 93-96.

³ *Prakaraṇapañcikā*, pp. 54-56.

Kumārila, though their verbal expression differs ; Kumārila holds that in cognition in the form of indeterminate perception neither the genus nor the differentia is presented to consciousness, and that all that is present is the individual in which both these characteristics subsist. Like Prabhākara, he holds that determinate perception is no less valid than indeterminate perception, since it merely makes explicit what is implicit in the indeterminate form.

The views of the school are best understood when brought into contact with the metaphysical doctrine to which they correspond. The essence of that doctrine accepts generality as a real existence which is perceptible as much as individual things, and in the simplest form of perception, therefore, the two aspects of reality are equally present.

The objects of perception include, besides generalities, substances, qualities, and, in the view of Kumārila, but not of Prabhākara, motion. The Nyāya holds that there are six forms of contact in perception; substance is perceived by conjunction; qualities by their inherence in what is in conjunction, and so also the generality of substance; generality of quality by inherence in that which inheres in that which is in conjunction; sound as a quality of ether, a portion of which forms the organ of hearing, is perceived by inherence, and its generality by inherence in that which inheres, while negation and inherence itself are perceived by a peculiar and artificial variety of contact, styled the relation of qualification and qualified. Prabhākara, though he accepts the doctrine of inherence, denies genus to quality, motion, and sound, and so contents himself with recognising the first, second, and fourth forms of contact as valid, and with pointing out that to perceive qualities, there is requisite the contact of the substance and the organs, of the organs and the qualities, of the organs and mind, and of mind and the self. Substance and qualities, he holds, may be perceived apart. In Kumārila's school, however, which denies inherence, the contacts are reduced to simple conjunction, and identity with what is in conjunction (*saṃyuktatādātmya*), the second covering perception of generality of substance, quality and

motion, while the generalities of these two can be perceived by a relationship of identity with that which is identical with that which is in conjunction.

A further technicality, also found in the Nyāya, is the discussion of the exact nature of the means of proof and its result. If the term Pramāṇa is understood as "means of proof," then perception denotes one or other of the contacts between object and organ, organ and mind, mind and soul, each of which is essential to the result (*phala*), in this case the mental percept. If, however, Pramāṇa denotes the cognition itself, then perception signifies the mental percept, and its result is the attitude of acceptance, rejection, or indifference of the subject to the object presented to him in the cognition.

Inference in the view of the Vṛttikāra¹ is the apprehension of a thing not before the subject, by reason of the perception of some other thing, between which and the first object we know an invariable connection to exist. The relation, according to Prabhākara, must be both general and constant; examples are the relation between the class and the individuals; substance and quality; the qualities of the same substance; or cause and effect. Smoke stands in an invariable relation to fire, but not *vice versa*, for on the Indian view glowing iron emits no smoke. Even individual events may thus be related in Kumārila's view; thus the sight of the constellation Kṛttikā suggests the proximity of Rohini. How, then, is this relation to be recognised? The Nyāya view, when it realised the question as a result of the introduction by Dignāga and, following him, Praśastapāda of the conception of a universal relationship (*vyāpti*) in lieu of mere reasoning by analogy, found refuge in the development of a transcendental perception (*alaukika pratyakṣa*²), by which in perceiving, for example, fire and smoke, the percipient recognised not merely the

¹ *Mīmāṃsā Sūtra*, p. 10; *Prakaraṇapañcikā*, pp. 64-87; *Śloka-vārttika*, pp. 345-405; *Mānameyodaya*, pp. 11-46; *Nyāyamañjarī*, pp. 109-41; *Logic and Atomism*, pt. II, ch. iii.

² The *Mīmāṃsā* rejects wholly the perception of Yogins, which is the precursor of this idea in the early Nyāya; cf. *Nyāyamañjarī*, pp. 93 ff.

connection of the individual fire and smoke perceived by him, but that of fire and smoke in their general aspect. Prabhākara, however, does not recognise this view, the elaboration of which is characteristic of a later epoch. He denies that sense perception can give the knowledge of a universal connection, since it deals only with particular times and places; he also rejects the view that the connection can rest on inference or presumption, since obviously thus there would be a *regressus in infinitum*; nor will he accept the view that it is due to mental activity only, as suggested by the doctrine of Dignāga, since if the mind had this power, why is man not omniscient? His own view is that fire and smoke are perceived by sense as in relation to each other, as qualified by certain conditions of place and time. By repeated experience the impression is gained that, while the presence of smoke is always accompanied by the presence of fire, the reverse relation does not hold, but is qualified always, unlike the former, by special conditions of place and time. Hence emerges the recognition of the permanent relation of smoke and fire, so that the sight of smoke immediately produces the conception of fire. He admits that we do not by inference arrive at any knowledge which we had not before, but he does not admit that this is any defect to the inferential process, which does not involve novelty of result. The school of Kumārila, however, in accordance with its definition of apprehension as involving knowledge of something not previously apprehended, points out, with perfect truth, that the actual inference gives us much more than the mere knowledge of the connection of smoke and fire, which is already known; it enables us to infer the presence, at a particular time and place beyond our vision, of the existence of fire as result of the perception of smoke. Cidānanda¹ recognises also the part played by the *reductio ad absurdum* in arriving at the knowledge of the universal connection.

The relationship, however, which affords the basis of inference, need not refer merely to things which fall within the limits of perception (*dr̥ṣṭasvalakṣaṇa*); matters which

¹ *Mānameyodaya*, p. 15.

are supersensuous (*adr̥ṣṭasvalakṣaṇa*) may equally be inferred; thus Prabhākara deduces from the general principle of the relation of cause and effect the existence of the capacity, e.g. of fire to burn. In the *Vṛttikāra* the distinction appears as *pratīyakṣato dr̥ṣṭasambandha* and *sāmānyato dr̥ṣṭasambandha*, terminology reminiscent at once of the *Nyāya Sūtra* and of *Praśastapāda*; the latter is illustrated by the inference to the sun's movement from the observation of a man's change of place as following on movement.

Following Dignāga and *Praśastapāda*, but in disagreement with the orthodox commentators on the *Nyāya Sūtra*, the *Mīmāṃsā* distinguishes between the inference for oneself, which is the true logical process, and that for another, which is in reality enunciation for another person of the process of reasoning, which leads to his drawing the conclusion already arrived at by the first person. In inference for one's self the process is that something is perceived, and recognised as invariably connected with something else, which thus is recalled to the mind; in inference for another a formal order of statement is usually adopted. First the proposition to be established is enunciated, e.g. "The mountain is fiery," the enunciation serving to bring before the mind any contrary judgment which might sublate it. Then the ground for the conclusion thus set out is given in the form of a general rule, supported by a corroborative instance, e.g. "Where there is smoke, there is fire, as in a kitchen." Finally, the necessary link between the conclusion and the general principle is supplied by the statement that the middle term exists in the subject, e.g. "The mountain is smoking." The order of the propositions is not regarded as of importance by Prabhākara or the other members of the school, who agree in rejecting the more complicated scheme of the *Nyāya* in which, with a certain redundancy due to its origin in dialectic, the argument is expounded in the five propositions, e.g. "The mountain is fiery; Because it is smoking; Where there is smoke there is fire, as in a kitchen; And this (mountain) is so (possessed of smoke with which fire is invariably concomitant); Therefore is it thus (fiery)." The omission of the last two members is no material injury to the scheme, while Buddhist logicians

reduce the scheme to two members only. The retention of the example is due to the origin of inference as a process of reasoning by simple analogy; even when the necessity of a universal connection was asserted by Dignāga and adopted by Praśastapāda and his followers, the example was religiously attained, and it is not until the latest days of the Nyāya that we find Laugākṣi Bhāskara declaring that the example is a mere superfluity. But Prabhākara and the school of Kumārila are agreed in insisting on the use of positive instances only, rejecting the process of argument from such a general proposition as, "Where there is no fire, there there is no smoke, as in a lake," though Kumārila himself recognises its utility, though not its necessity, or, as in the Buddhist view, sole validity.

In the case of inference also there arises the problem, already seen in regard to perception, of the exact force of the term Anumāna and the corresponding result. If Anumāna is used as equivalent to "Inferential Cognition," which is more precisely designated Anumiti, then the fruit or result is the attitude of acceptance, rejection or indifference assumed by the knowing subject to the inferred result. If, however, Anumāna is referred to the means by which the cognition is attained, there is a divergence of view as to the exact process to which the name should be applied. The most immediate cause of inference is the perception of the middle term or minor proposition, e.g. "The mountain is smoking," but a more scientific Nyāya view accepts as the true Anumāna the whole mental process, including the consciousness of the relation between the middle and the major terms, through which the major term comes to be predicated of the minor term, e.g. fire of the mountain. The result in either case is the inferential cognition itself.

The doctrine of fallacies is deduced both by Prabhākara and by Kumārila from the definition given by the Vṛttikāra of the nature of inference. Thus Prabhākara holds that the condition, that the relation between the two terms whence the inference is deduced, must be previously known, precludes all those cases styled in logic cases of the too restricted middle (*śūdhāreya*), where the middle term, which it is proposed to use as a basis of proof, is connected with the subject

of the inference alone, thus permitting no further conclusion. Earth, for example, has odour, but nothing further can be derived from this unique relationship. Again the relation must be universally valid, a rule which excludes the too general middle (*sādhāraṇa*). It is impossible to prove that sound is eternal because it can be known, since many things can be known and yet are not eternal. The necessity of some relation existing excludes the variety of middle term known as annulled (*bādhita*); to prove sound eternal because it is a product is impossible, since the character of being a product is flatly inconsistent with eternity. Finally, the necessity, that the middle term should be perceived as the basis of the attribution of the major to the minor, excludes the variety of middle term known as unreal (*asiddha*); thus the perception by the Buddha of righteousness and unrighteousness on the ground of his omniscience is an illegitimate argument, since the omniscience of the Buddha has never been perceived. No other form of fallacy of the middle is accepted by Prabhākara; he rejects the Nyāya view of the fallacy of the counter-balanced middle (*satpratipakṣa*); which balances against the argument, e.g. of the imperceptibility of air because of its lack of colour, the argument of its perceptibility because of its tangibility. Prabhākara's argument is that it is not possible for contradictory predicates, such as lack of colour and tangibility, are thus assumed to be, to exist in respect of one subject; hence one of the two alleged inferences is wholly invalid, and there is no true counterbalancing. He holds that really contradictory inferences are possible only of some subject whose nature is unknown, in which case, however, in the absence of the essential known relation, no true inference is attainable.

The views of Kumārila do not differ materially from those of Prabhākara; he classifies the too restricted and the too general fallacies under the head of doubtful (*anaikāntika*), and adds as a third class the case of conflicting inferences, which he accepts, contrary to the views of Prabhākara. Of the unreal (*asiddha*) and the contradictory types of fallacy he gives various sub-divisions. In

this and in his elaborate examination of the generality (*sāmānya*), which lies at the basis of inference, he shows plainly his close relation to the Nyāya and his polemic against the Buddhist views. In accord with the older view accepted in Buddhist logic, Prabhākara recognises not merely fallacies of the ground (*hetu*), but also of the minor (*pakṣa*), the example (*dṛṣṭānta*), and even of the proposition (*pratijñā*), which in the Nyāya view are all reduced to special cases of fallacies of the ground.

Analogy or comparison is accepted by both schools of Mīmāṃsā with the Vṛttikāra,¹ but their view of the exact nature of this form of proof differs from that of the Nyāya generally, which accepts analogy as a distinct form of proof. In the Nyāya view the process results in the cognition that an object, hitherto unknown, when brought within the range of perception, is recognised, by reason of its similarity to something already known, to be the object designated by a name communicated by some person of experience. Thus a man who has never seen a buffalo in his life is informed by a forester that the buffalo is like the cow; on entering the waste he sees an animal similar in appearance to the cow, and formulates the judgment, "This thing is a buffalo." The precise force of the judgment is disputed in the school, but the best opinion is that it applies not merely to the single animal seen, but that the percipient acquires a correct apprehension of the specific nature of the whole class buffalo. Thus, as Udayana² says, the effect of this means of proof is to give a clear understanding of the meaning of a word, though he rejects the view, held by Bhāsarvajña³ and his followers in the Nyāya school, that analogy can be reduced to a particular instance of verbal testimony (*śabda*), as well as that of the Vaiśeṣika, which reduces analogy to inference. The Mīmāṃsā view of the analogical cognition is that it consists

¹ P. 10; *Prakaranapañcikā*, pp. 110-12; *Śloka-vārttika*, pp. 433-50; *Mānameyodaya*, pp. 47-51; *Śaddarśanasamuccaya*, pp. 292, 293.

² *Kusumāñjali*, III, 8-12; *Nyāyamañjarī*, pp. 141-49; *Tārki-ḥarakaṣa*, pp. 84-93.

³ *Nyāyāsāra*, pp. 30, 31. The Jain view (*Śaddarśanasamuccaya*, pp. 205, 206) reduces it to recognition, a form of Parokṣa.

in the recognition in an object not presented to the senses of similarity to an object which is actually perceived. Thus, in the instance taken above, the judgment arrived at is, "The cow which I saw in the city is similar to the animal¹ I now see in the forest." Both schools agree in this view, though Prabhākara regards similarity as constituting a distinct metaphysical category, a position denied by the school of Kumārila, who treat it as a quality arising from the fact that more than one object possesses the same set of qualities. The separate character of analogy as a means of proof is deduced by distinguishing it from the other means which it resembles. Thus it is not perception, since the cow is not perceived at the time the judgment is formulated; it is not verbal testimony, for it involves only the perception of similarity; it is not inference, as the mental process is quite different; nor is it mere memory, for the similarity is not remembered. The Nyāya view is declared erroneous; the assertion that the buffalo is like the cow cannot be assumed as a basis for the conclusion, since, as a mere human utterance, it may be untrustworthy; the cognition of the buffalo and its similarity to the cow is pure perception; the conclusion that the animal seen is what is denoted by the word "buffalo" is merely inference, so that, if the Nyāya view is adopted, there is no real independent form of proof called analogy (*upamāna*), or true analogical judgment (*upamiti*). While the polemic against the Nyāya is not unsuccessful, the discussion makes it clear that there is no real separate sphere for analogy as a means of proof.

Unlike the Nyāya, both schools of Mīmāṃsā accept, with the Vṛttikāra, presumption (*arthāpatti*) as a separate means of proof.² But Prabhākara's analysis of this form of demonstration differs radically from that of Kumārila. Presumption in his view arises when it is necessary to assume some fact in order to avoid inconsistency in respect of some thing which is actually perceived. Thus, if we know that a

¹ For "the buffalo"; the Mīmāṃsā view does not recognise the previous information as to the likeness of the cow and buffalo.

² *Mīmāṃsā Sūtra*, p. 10; *Prakaraṇapāñcikā*, pp. 113-18; *Ślokovārttika*, pp. 450-72; *Mānameyodaya*, pp. 51-57; cf. *Nyāyamāñ-jorī*, pp. 36-48; *Śaṅkarānandasamuccaya*, pp. 293-95.

man who is alive is not in his house, we must assume that he has gone out, in order to make our thinking consistent with our perception. To give rise to presumption there must, Prabhākara holds, be doubt, which the presumption removes, and this element serves to distinguish presumption from inference, since inference can only begin when a certain fact, e.g. the existence of smoke, is known with perfect certainty. On the other hand, Kumārila's view is that presumption is impossible, if the original fact were in doubt; it is only because the absence of the man from his house is for certain known that it can come into operation; the origin of presumption lies rather in the apparent inconsistency of two equally certain facts, in this case, the man's absence and his being alive, which leads to the enunciation of a presumption to reconcile the apparent discrepancy, and it is this reconciliation of apparent discrepancies which marks out presumption from inference. The Nyāya on the contrary finds place for presumption under the purely negative (*kevalavyatirekin*) form of inference, in which it is impossible to adduce a positive instance of the general rule, but the Mīmāṃsā could not accept this view since it declined to regard the use of the negative form in inference as satisfactory.

Unlike the Nyāya the Vṛttikāra¹ accepts non-existence (*abhāva*), or, as it is also termed, non-apprehension (*anupalabdhi*), as a separate means of proof. The argument in favour of this view adopted by Kumārila is that the absence of any thing, e.g. of a jar on a particular spot of ground, cannot be the object of direct perception, which admittedly, according to the definition of the *Mīmāṃsā Sūtra*, requires a present contact with the organs of sense, nor can it be arrived at by inference, analogy, presumption or verbal testimony. It can only arise into an object of knowledge through the fact that none of the normal methods of cognition can come into operation, and this peculiarity distinguishes it from any of these means. Prabhākara,

¹ P. 10; *Prakaranapañcika*, pp. 118-25; *Ślokovārttika*, pp. 473-92; *Mānameyodaya*, pp. 58-62, 114-18; cf. *Nyāyamañjarī*, pp. 49-54; *Śaddarsanīsamuccaya*, pp. 295-98; it is refuted from the Jain standpoint, *ibid.* pp. 206-7.

with the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika, declines to accept non-apprehension as a distinct means of proof. When we say, "The jar is not on the ground," all that we mean is that, if the jar were on the ground, we would perceive it there, but that as a matter of fact we see the ground alone. The seeing of the ground is mere perception, and the further statement is merely a qualification of what is perceived in terms of something which, formerly seen along with it, is not now present. In this there is no separate mental process leading to proof. The Nyāya also escapes the difficulty by adopting a peculiar doctrine of its own, under which non-existence, regarded as a positive entity, is perceived by a peculiar mode of contact known as the relation of qualifier and qualified.

Whether, however, four, with Prabhākara, or, with the Vṛttikāra and Kumārila, five means of proof other than verbal testimony or scripture are reckoned, all these means of proof are subject to the defect that they do not avail to determine the nature of Dharma, man's duty and righteousness. This is established by the Sūtra (I, 1, 4) for the case of perception; that means of proof deals only with existing things which can be brought into contact with the organs of sense, but duty is a thing which is not already existing, but needs man's action to bring it to fruition, and duty is not tangible so as to be able to come into contact with the organs. Inference, analogy, presumption, and non-apprehension, all have relation to perception, and for that reason are vitiated by the defects of the latter, as we gather from the Vṛttikāra, who thus supplements Jaimini. On the other hand, Jaimini declares that the relation of the word to its meaning is natural and eternal, and Vedic injunctions are, therefore, the source of knowledge of duty, which is something not open to ordinary means of apprehension. Such injunctions are authoritative, according to Bādarāyaṇa as cited in the *Mīmāṃsā Sūtra*, because of their independence. In the definition of the Vṛttikāra¹ scriptural cognition (*śāstra*) is the cognition of some thing, which is not percept-

¹ P. 10; *Prakaranapañcikā*, pp. 87-110, 131-40, 161-70; *Śoka-vārttika*, pp. 405-33, 498 ff, 728 ff; *Mānameyodaya*, pp. 40-47; cf. *Nyāyamañjarī*, pp. 150 ff, 205 ff.

ible, through the instrumentality of intelligible sounds, that is words, whose meaning is known. The further analysis of Prabhākara shows that each word is composed of letters which are severally apprehended, impressions of the earlier letters blending with that produced by the cognition of the last letter to bring about the idea of the whole word, which alone has the power to bring about the comprehension of a single definite meaning. The letters, then, are the means of verbal cognition, since it is they which by combination compose the word and bring about the comprehension of its meaning. With Kumārila Prabhākara agrees in disregarding the grammatical school's doctrine of Sphota, an entity which is invented to meet the difficulty felt by the grammarians as to the possibility of any combination of impressions from individual letters producing the unity, which enables us to comprehend the meaning of a word, and in this view the Vedānta, Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika and Sāṅkhya are at one with the Mīmāṃsā, leaving the Yoga only to support the doctrine of the grammarians.¹

The meaning of words is declared by Jaimini to be natural (*autpattika*), and Prabhākara insists on the fact that words cannot be supposed to owe their meanings to convention, whether human or divine. The view of the school in this regard can hardly be regarded as anything else than an attempt to bring the doctrine of verbal testimony into harmony with their traditional beliefs in the nature in the Veda, which doubtless long preceded their speculations on the nature of the relation of word and meaning. The Nyāya view, that meanings were given to words by a convention due to the action of God, offended the Mīmāṃsā belief that the Veda had no creator, and that no God, as understood by the Nyāya, existed. The alternative of human convention contradicted flatly the Mīmāṃsā belief that the essential function of the Veda was to lay down injunctions for the performance of actions, whence arose an invisible potency (*apūrva*) leading to a desirable end, and that this potency was a thing of

¹ Cf. Max Müller, *Six Systems*, pp. 527-44; a full refutation of the doctrine of Bhartṛhari that Śabda is the source of the world and is the lower form of the absolute, Brahman, is given in *Nyāyamañjarī*, pp. 531-36; cf. *Sarvadarśanasamgraha*, ch. xiii.

which no person, save through the Veda, could have any knowledge. The Nyāya argument in favour of convention, derived from the case of proper names, is met by the admission that in the case of such names convention is active, but that common names stand on a different footing. In the former case, we know that the persons or things so called have a beginning in time, and that some person must have applied the names to them; in the case of common names we have no warrant for finding a beginning in time for either the things or the words. There has been no beginning of the world or of men, and they must have from the first talked of the things of the world, just as in actual life it is from observing the conversation of his elders, or by their instruction, that a youth learns the meanings of words. What is still more conclusive evidence is that, unless we recognised, as we do, that words possess of their own nature meanings, we could never form the conception of conventional meanings, which is a later development.

The eternity of the word is established formally and at length by Jaimini in a systematic refutation (I, 1, 6-23) of the objections directed against the doctrine by the Nyāya school in particular. The Nyāya¹ holds that the eternity of the word is precluded by the fact that it is perceptible only after effort; that it is evanescent; that in common parlance men talk of producing a sound, just as they speak of producing any ordinary article; that the same word is pronounced by many people and in many places; that words have changes in form, such as *dadhy atra* for *dadhi*; and that, when uttered by many people, the volume of sound is increased. The reply of Jaimini insists that the apparent production of sound, regarded by the Nyāya as a creation, is only a manifestation of a pre-existing entity, a fact in harmony with the disappearance of words on the cessation of the manifestation, while products proper remain in being. The analogy of the sun refutes the argument from simultaneity of perception by many persons; the change to

¹ The Sūtra (II, 2, 23-59) deals with the topic, but in such a way as to show in all likelihood posteriority to the *Mīmāṃsā Sūtra*.

dadhy atra is not a modification of the letter *i*, but the substitution of a quite different form; increase of magnitude refers to the tone, not to the word itself. Positive arguments for the eternity of the word are not lacking. If it were not so, it would fail in its purpose, the conveying of a meaning to another. Again, we do find in point of fact that men recognise words as being the same when uttered on diverse occasions by diverse people. Language supports the Mīmāṃsā case; when a word is repeated, we talk of ten repetitions of the word, not of ten words. Moreover, no cause for the destruction of words is adduced, and in non-eternal things causes of destruction are always to be found. Finally, there is Vedic authority for the doctrine and no valid counter authority.

The word then exists ever, but only from time to time by effort on the part of some being is it made manifest to us. But effort is not enough; the deaf do not hear, and the effort must be supported by a suitable organ which aids in the cognition of the word. Through the effort on the part of the speaker, the air from his lungs rises upwards and comes into contact with the vocal chords, by which it is modified in character. Passing, then, out from the mouth, it reaches the ears of those near enough to be affected, produces in their ears a change favourable to audition, and passes out, bringing to a close the audition. The ear cavity contains a layer of air, upon which the air current issuing from the speaker's mouth impinges, producing the condition on which audition supervenes. Thus the Mīmāṃsā rejects the primitive conception under which, as light from the eye travels to its object and brings back vision, so the sound travels in some form to the source of the sound, as held by the Jains, and the Sāṃkhya view that the sense of hearing, as all-pervading, reaches the place of the sound. It also rejects the Buddhist view that actual contact is unnecessary for hearing, and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika doctrine of propagation of sound on the analogy of waves, or the filaments of the Kadamba flower, in the ether until it reaches the ether enclosed in the ear cavity, which, on that view, constitutes the organ of hearing. To this opinion Kumārila objects that, the ether being one and indivisible, if one ear is

affected, all ears should equally be affected, and every sound be heard by every one; or, again, if one man is deaf, everyone should no less be deaf. The Mīmāṃsā evades this objection by the doctrine that the ear cavity contains air, and that it differs in size and shape from man to man. A further objection to the wave theory is also based on the fact that sounds travelling with the wind are heard at further distances than sounds travelling against the wind, which is inexplicable if the propagation of waves takes place in the ether, which, of course, is unaffected by wind.

The essential character of the word is, in the view of Jaimini, not mere denotation, but injunction, a view which clearly stands in close relation to the doctrine that the meaning of words is largely learned by the young from the observation of intercourse among the old; one addresses the other, and the other acts as a result; one says, *gām ānaya*, the other brings the cow. Hence, as against the Vedānta, it is denied that the essence of Vedic texts lies in the making manifest of the sole existent Brahman, and asserted that, even when this seems to be the case, the real import of the text is an injunction to meditate on the Brahman. From this view Prabhākara proceeds to develop a conclusion, which is in harmony with the view of Śābarasvāmīn, that words themselves have no meaning, and obtain it only in sentences, properly injunctive clauses; *gām* by itself is nothing, but attains meaning when conjoined with *ānaya*, the whole then signifying generically the genus cow as connected with bringing. This view in the school obtains the name of the theory of signification in syntactical combination (*anvitābhīdhāna*), in opposition to the view of Kumārila, who admits that words possess a meaning independently of combination in injunctive sentences, and whose theory accepts, therefore, the combination of significant terms (*abhihitānvaya*). The two schools, however, are at one in holding that the signification of words is a class signification (I, 3, 30-35), as the theory of the eternity of words demands. The modern Nyāya, on the other hand, insists that the import of words is always the concrete individual, while the older Nyāya (II, 2, 61-71) adopts the doctrine that the word expresses the class (*jāti*), individual (*vyakti*),

and characteristic mark of the class (*ākṛti*), all at once. The Buddhist view, again, insists on negative determination only, on the ground that it is impossible to determine positively the specific nature of anything, and that all that can be attained is a series of negations, a view which Kumārila refutes at great length,¹ insisting that the doctrine would mean the impossibility of distinguishing between any two things, since, for instance, both the cow and the horse are negatives of the elephant, and could never deal with individuals, each negation being necessarily general. The defender of Apoha thus accepts the existence of negative classes, which must be all identical, since he cannot rely, *ex hypothesi*, on any positive means of discrimination between them.

The case for the claim that words denote individuals, as put in the Sūtra (I, 3, 33) in the view of Prabhākara, is that, if it were not so, all injunctions, Vedic or profane, would become meaningless; number and gender would be out of place with regard to nouns; there could be no words to express qualities, and agreement between noun and adjective would be impossible. Prabhākara replies by insisting that, as indicated by the *Bhāṣya*, if words had individual meanings, such a sentence as, "One should pile the fire altar in the form of a kite," would be meaningless, as it cannot be supposed that such an injunction was intended to refer to an individual kite, while its plain meaning is a reference to the class "kite." Without this element of generality all injunctions are absurd, and the necessary individual reference in certain cases is obtained through the generality, with which it is inseparably connected. Kumārila adds that this view is supported by the fact that the word "cow," as experience shows, does not suggest to us an individual cow, but the class; if individuals were denoted by words, a generic idea like "cow" would be impossible, and even if possible would merely consist of the impression of all the peculiarities of all cows known to the thinker. Again, the word cannot denote all the individuals, since this would mean that the

¹ *Slokaṭṭika*, pp. 566-614; *Nyāyamañjarī*, pp. 303-8; contrast Ratnakīrti's *Apohasiddhi* (*Six Buddhist Nyāya Tracts*, pp. 1-19).

word possessed as many potencies of denotation as there were individuals, and, as all the individuals could never be known, the word would never fully be comprehended. Nor could the word denote an aggregate of individuals since all individuals cannot be known, and therefore an aggregate could not be known, while, even if it could be known, as its constituent parts would be ever perishing or replaced, the signification of the word would be a constant flux. Finally, if the word meant a single individual only, there could be no eternal connection between word and meaning, and, in the absence of any means of discovering which individual was meant, action would be impossible. The difficulty regarding sacrificial operations in regard to a class instead of an individual, is disposed of by pointing out that such actions must be performed by substances, and that the injunctions specify, not the individual substance to be used in any special case, but the class of substance, individual portions of which are applied by each sacrificer.

As regards the authority attaching to words there is a sharp distinction between the older school, followed by Prabhākara and Kumārila. Prabhākara holds that the only authoritative testimony to things beyond the reach of the senses and other means of proof is the scripture (*śāstra*). Other words deal only with matters cognised by perception, inference, etc., and have no inherent cogency; if they give us true information, it is merely because we believe the speaker to be trustworthy. Thus, like the Vaiśeṣika school,¹ Prabhākara holds all cognition of this kind to be based on inference, the argument being, "This man says something; he must know what he is talking about; what he says, therefore, must be true." From another point of view, human words are of no higher value than remembrance, which is admittedly no source of valid universal judgments. Thus the sole possibility of the validity of verbal testimony lies in the Veda, which has no author, and therefore is not vitiated by the doubts as to trustworthiness and ability of correct expression, which precludes us from

¹ Cf. *Nyāyamañjarī*, pp. 152 ff.

according implicit belief to the assertions made to us by any merely human authority.

There is an obvious difficulty in this reasoning, when it is remembered that Prabhākara, like the Vṛttikāra, insists on the self-evidence of cognitions, from which it would seem to follow that the assertions of any man are *prima facie* valid, until sublated by better evidence. Kumārila, who is always anxious to accommodate the views of the school to popular beliefs, is at the same time more in harmony with the tenets of the school in adopting a doctrine, which does not involve the general denial of the validity of human testimony. He adopts, therefore, the plan of distinguishing testimony as human and super-human (*apauruṣeya*), while admitting both as valid, though for different reasons. In the case of the Veda there is no author, and therefore the possibility of defects is absolutely precluded. In the case of human testimony its validity may be impaired by defects in the speaker, but the presence of excellencies in him precludes the presence of defects, so that if we are assured of the latter we can be assured that the defects do not exist. But it must not be understood that the excellencies positively contribute to the validity of his utterances, which they possess of themselves; the excellencies are of service merely in assuring us of the absence of those defects, which might cause his testimony to be suspect.

The Veda, however, has special claims on our regard, and the *Mīmāṃsā Sūtra* (I, 1, 24-28) meets detailed criticisms of its claim to eternity. Thus it is argued against its validity that parts of it bear names of men, or refer to human beings, to which Jaimini replies that passages bear names of persons who studied them in detail, and that apparent human names in the Veda are really mere cases of homonymy; thus, as Śābarasvāmin points out, *Pravāhaṇa* is not the name of a man, but an epithet, "The excellent carrier." Similarly, apparently absurd statements, such as "The cows performed a sacrificial session," are to be understood merely as emphasising the value of some ritual action by way of hyperbole, not as showing that the authors of the Veda were foolish mortals. The eternity of words, and the fact that it alone serves to reveal the unseen potency, which


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results from obeying its injunctions, are conclusive proofs of the eternity of the Veda, and the alternative view of a creator is needless and unsatisfactory both in regard to the Veda and to the world.

Other forms of proof, both Prabhākara and Kumārila expressly reject.¹ Sambhava, which is variously interpreted as probability, e.g. that ten is included in fifty, or much more probably as inclusion pure and simple, is regarded as merely a form of inference. Rumour, which like Sambhava is claimed as a means of proof by the Paurāṇikas, is patently useless for purposes of proof; its source being uncertain, it is quite impossible to afford its contents any measure of credit. Gesture (*ceṣṭā*), which is given as a means of proof by the Tantra school, the Mīmāṃsā ignores.

The relation between the various means of proof is developed by Kumārila; the use of any means of proof such as inference is debarred if there is a more direct mode of cognition, e.g. sense perception, or if the contrary of what is sought to be established is established in advance by the use of some simpler means of proof.

¹ *Prakaraṇapañcikā*, pp. 125, 126; *Mānameyodaya*, pp. 64, 65; *Śloka-vārttika*, p. 492 (vv. 57, 58); *Tārāhikarākṣa*, pp. 116, 117; *Śaddarśanasamuccaya*, p. 207.



III

THE WORLD OF REALITY

THERE is nothing to show that the question of the reality of the world had ever occurred to the framers of the *Mīmāṃsā Sūtra*, but in Śābarasvāmin's *Bhāṣya* we find the problem definitely faced in answer to the onslaught made by the Nihilist school of Buddhism on the whole conception of the reality of existence as we know it. The doctrine of Nāgārjuna,¹ doubtless an effective restatement of tendencies earlier manifested in the Buddhist schools, denies at once the reality of the external world, and of the ideal world which seems to present us with the knowledge of external reality. That much of its dialectic is sophistic is true, but its novelty of view and the energy with which Nāgārjuna, an eastern parallel of Zeno, urged his paradoxes, evoked from the orthodox schools elaborate replies, both the *Nyāya* and the *Vedānta Sūtras* seeking to refute heresies so dangerous to their own tenets. The reply of the *Mīmāṃsā*, in keeping with what appears to be the early character of that Sūtra as compared with the *Vedānta* or *Nyāya Sūtras* is given only in the *Vṛttikāra* as cited in the *Bhāṣya*.² An opponent objects, in his version, to the validity of our waking perceptions, on the ground that in a dream we have cognitions which all admit to be without foundation, and, if this is true of one set of cognitions, it may be assumed to be equally true of another. The reply of the *Vṛttikāra* is, in effect, that the argument assumes what is to be

¹ *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*, ed. *Bibliotheca Buddhica*, 1903-1913; Max Walliser, *Die Mittlere Lehre des Nāgārjuna*, Heidelberg, 1911 and 1912. Cf. *Sarvadārtanasaṃgraha*, ch. II; *Śarvasiddhāntasaṃgraha*, ch. IV.

² Pp. 8-10.

proved, namely, that all cognitions as such are invalid. On the contrary, we can form the idea of the invalidity of dream cognition simply from our having waking cognitions which afford us a basis for discrediting the dream cognitions, and we can explain the defects of dream cognitions by the assumption that the mind in dream is weak and does not act effectively, a view which we can support by the fact that in deep sleep the mind is wholly absent, suggesting that in the dream state it is in a condition intermediate between its effective waking presence and its disappearance. The opponent, however, continues the argument by urging that the object of the cognition is really a void, thus discrediting the validity of the cognition. There is, he says, no difference between the object of perception and the idea; the idea is directly perceived, and there is nothing in reality corresponding to an external object. The Vrttikāra replies that this view rests on the erroneous assumption that an idea must have a form; it really is without form, which, on the other hand, the external object possesses. What we perceive is not our idea, but something localised as outside ourselves; no idea can perceive another idea, for each has a momentary existence only, whence one cannot be present to another. The opponent contends that the second idea has a certain continuity with the first; as it originates, it becomes known to the first and reveals to it the object, just as a lamp illumines and thus makes known things. Or, put in another way, it is the idea which first originates, and then the object becomes known, having no anterior real existence. The Vrttikāra refutes this by insisting that, though the idea originates first, it is not known first; as we have seen, the idea is known by inference from the fact of our cognition of an object, and the actual knowledge and the knowledge of the idea cannot possibly be simultaneous. Though we know an object, we sometimes say we do not know it, that is, that we are not conscious of having an idea about it. Further, ideas are essentially connected with names, while perception is essentially immediate knowledge, in which naming is not necessarily involved. Moreover, if the idea and the object had the same form, as is assumed in the opponent's argument, this would sublate the idea, not the object, which is directly

perceived, but in truth the idea is formless and known by inference, while the object is endowed with form and is an object of sense perception. Or, again, the reality of an external world is shown by the fact that we have the idea of a mat only when threads form its material cause; if otherwise, then a man might form the idea of a jar despite the use of threads in the composition of an object; put more broadly, our ideas are not the free result of our mental activity; they are imposed upon us as regards their content by external reality.

The argument as a whole thus falls into two parts, the first dealing with the contention that ideas have no foundation (*nirālambana*), and the second with the view that external reality is void (*sūnya*). Both these contentions are the tenets of the Nihilism of Buddhism, and there is no real ground for doubt that the arguments of the Vṛttikāra are directed against this contention. Kumārila,¹ however, or some predecessor, has interpreted the passage otherwise, treating the first part of the argument as directed against the Vijñānavāda of Vasubandhu and Asaṅga,² which admitted the reality of ideas, while denying that of the outer world, and the second part he treats as a refutation of the Śūnyavāda of the Mādhyamika school of Nāgārjuna. Precisely the same fate³ has overtaken the corresponding discussions of the Śūnyavāda in the *Nyāya* and *Vedānta Sūtras*; Vātsyāyana still interpreted the former (IV, 2, 25-33) in its true sense, but Vācaspati Miśra reads into part of it an attack on the Vijñānavāda; in the case of the Vedānta Śaṅkara turns the whole passage (II, 2, 28-32) into an attack on that school, while Rāmānuja treats it as refuting both Buddhist doctrines. The causes for these vagaries of interpretation are obvious; the Śūnyavāda in its refutation of external reality used the arguments which the Vijñānavāda later employed,

¹ *Ślokaṇvṛttikā*, pp. 217-67, 268-345. *Prakaraṇapañcikā*, pp. 141 ff, 171 (a fragment only); cf. *Nyāyakanikā*, pp. 253 ff, *Mānamaya-ḍaya*, pp. 119-22; *Nyāyamañjarī*, pp. 536 ff (Vijñānavāda), 548 ff (Śūnyavāda).

² *Mahāyānasūtrālamkāra*, ed. and trans. S. Lévi, Paris, 1907-11; *Sarvadarśanasamgraha*, ch. I; *Sarvasiddhāntasamgraha*, ch. IV (ii); *Śaḍdarśanasamuccaya*, pp. 40, 41, 47.

³ Jacobi, *J.A.O.S.*, XXXI, 1 ff.

but it supplemented the conclusions it arrived at regarding external reality by demolishing the value of our ideas. Any reply to the Śūnyavāda must therefore include an answer which would apply to the Vijñānavāda, and later authors like Kumārila naturally thought that the discussion must deal with the more recent and more convincing school of Vijñānavāda. But the Vṛttikāra shows no knowledge of the peculiar terminology of the Vijñānavāda, such as its distinction between the Ālaya-vijñāna, the quasi-permanent consciousness which constitutes the individual until he attains Nirvāṇa, and the particular presentations which are thence derived (*pravṛtti-vijñāna*). Moreover, the argument from the dream condition is not peculiar to the Vijñānavāda; on the contrary it is a special favourite of the Mādhyamikas, occurring in the *Mādhyamika Sūtra* (VII, 34) and in other texts cited in the Vṛtti on that text.

The view of Prabhākara is in accord with the Vṛttikāra and the *Bhāṣya*, but Kumārila's interpretation of the passage has the advantage of eliciting from him a most interesting exposition of, and attack upon, the Buddhist Vijñānavāda and Śūnyavāda theories. The discussion shows the close affinity of the two doctrines, and the form of the argument is often complicated by the resort to elaborate syllogistic reasoning, but the whole makes a very creditable effort to refute either the extreme scepticism of the Mādhyamika or the extreme idealism of the Yogācāras. The reality of an external world is vehemently insisted upon as the only foundation of the common facts of life, including such distinctions as those of virtue and vice, teacher and pupil. If there were nothing but ideas, all our views would be false, since they essentially rest on the belief in external reality. Moreover, there is a complete counter argument; cognitions, we hold, have real substrata in the external world; this notion of ours is correct, because it is without contradiction, like the notion of the falsity of dream cognition. If you reply by denying the validity of the probative example which we adduce, then the doctrine that dream cognitions are false would disappear, and you would lose the chief argument adduced against the reality which

underlies cognitions as a whole. Moreover, in dream cognitions, which you adduce as examples where there is no underlying reality, we find on examination that there is always a real substratum, however much distorted and disguised. If, again, you argue that the unreality of our waking cognitions is revealed by the fact that the Yogin sees reality far otherwise, we retort by denying the validity of his perception, and citing against him the visions of our Yogins. Nor can we accept the arguments of the Buddhist logicians, such as Dignāga, who assert that the activity of the mind can supply the full complement of notions, which appear to us to reflect reality;¹ without an external world all these mental conceptions would be meaningless, for we deal not with conceptions, but with the facts of life.

Against the conception that cognition alone exists to the exclusion of cogniser and cognised, Kumārila contends with special energy. The case for this conception is set out by him with much care as the prelude to his reply to the Śūnyavāda. It rests on the difficulty of understanding how cognition and cognised can be related. There cannot really be two entities, one formless and one possessing form, for in memory, when no object is present, we still have cognition of form, showing that the cognition has form, and rendering the hypothesis of an external reality mere superfluity. How, again, can there be contact between the incorporeal cognition and the external object? An object can be perceived only if it has form, but again the form does not exist until it is perceived, which involves contradiction. Again, even if contact were possible, how could two things, in themselves without form, acquire it in this way? Moreover, the idea we have of a double moon is admittedly erroneous, and therefore cannot rest on reality. So also we use a variety of words of varied gender for the stars, and a masculine word (*dārāḥ*) for a wife, which would be impossible if reality controlled our ideas. The same thing, e.g. a lovely woman, raises very different feelings in the mind of the ascetic, the

¹ Cf. Rāṣṇākaśānti's treatment of inference as internal only, *Antarvyūptisamarthana* (Six Buddhist Nyāya Tracts, pp. 103-14).

lover, and the dog. The same object appears to us in one aspect short, in the other long, and so forth. All this refutes the possibility of an external reality. The true theory is one suggested by the doctrine of impressions, which the *Mīmāṃsā* itself uses to explain memory and dream cognition. There is one thing only, the cognition, but, as the result of impressions left by previous cognitions, there appears the distinction of cogniser, cognised, and cognition, in place of the unity. Each idea is momentary, but it can and does impress its successor; there is no substantial reality like the soul, but a never-ceasing series of momentary ideas, impressed each by the former, gives man the semblances which we regard in ordinary life as the outer world and the soul.

The reply of Kumārila to this ingenious suggestion emphasises the impossibility of belief in the momentary character of ideas and the continuance which the theory requires. If each idea is really momentary, and perishes utterly, as the Buddhists assert, how can it affect the subsequent idea, contemporaneity of ideas being negated by the Buddhist theory? How, again, can impressions create new sensations, as opposed to mere reviving memories? How can the essential distinction of cogniser and cognised be sublated? How can each cognition in an interminable series contain in itself the whole of the past, when manifestly it does not make any attempt to do so? In what sense can our cognition, say of one animal, followed by that of another animal, be said to involve the conditioning of the second by the quite disparate first? We have many cognitions which are not the result of impressions at all. The only possible explanation of the unity and continuity of our mental life, lies in the recognition of a substantial unity in the self.

Kumārila insists that no idea can comprehend itself, and also that no idea can be comprehended by another. He rejects, therefore, not merely the Buddhist view but the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* conception by which our ideas are the object of mental perception, and the allied *Sautrāntika*¹

¹ *Śaṅkaraśāstrīyasaṃuccaya*, p. 47; *Sarvasiddhāntasamgraha*, IV, ii, 1-7.

speculation, which holds that the form of the object is impressed on the cognition. The objection to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view appears to be that the idea is understood by the school to be perceived simultaneously with the object, and, as the perception of the idea requires that it should be provided with visible form, that is, colour and extension, there would be no possibility of demonstrating the existence of the external object, since, the form being cognised with the idea, an external reference would be needless. The objection, it must be noted, is not cogent against the developed form of the Nyāya doctrine, in which it is held that on the actual cognition (*vyavasāya*) there supervenes the mental perception of the cognition (*anuvyavasāya*); the cognition thus brings reality immediately before the mind, while in a secondary act the cognition itself is made the object of introspection, as in the accepted theory of modern psychology. The Mīmāṃsā, by ignoring this possible view, renders it necessary to hold that a cognition can never be the object of introspection; it is an entity which is inferred from the fact of cognition; its existence is known, but not as an object of sense-perception of any kind. Mental perception, which the school admits, is thus restricted to those forms of mental activity which are not cognitive.

There remains, however, yet another contention of the Śūnyavāda which Kumārila seeks to refute. It is based on the view that atoms are invisible, that aggregates of atoms are invisible, that all objects, being composed of such aggregates, are invisible and incomprehensible, and therefore void. The weight of this argument lies in the fact that the Mīmāṃsā gives a more or less hearty acceptance to the doctrine of atoms, though Kumārila is careful not to bind himself definitively to it. The conglomeration of atoms, it is urged, is impossible, since atoms have no extension, or at any rate no parts, and no contact between them is, therefore, conceivable. More generally, it is also contended that no whole of parts can really exist. If it did, it must either reside in its entirety in each of the component parts, which is positively absurd, or it must reside collectively in all the parts; in this event, even if it can be assumed that it is something over and above the parts, it would be perceived only when all the parts had

been perceived, which would be normally impossible, absolutely so in the case of a whole of imperceptible parts like atoms. This dialectic, which the *Nyāya Sūtra* (IV, 2, 7-14) also seeks to face, is met with the argument that, as there is an interminable dispute between the opposing schools, the Buddhists who deny the difference of the whole from its parts, and the *Nyāya* who assert the distinction, the safe course lies in the *via media* of admitting that a whole is in one sense different from, and in another sense not different from, its constituent parts. A whole, therefore, is not of a simple and absolute character, and resembles an object with variegated hues, but it is not the less real for that. Invalidity applies to doubtful ideas, not to ideas of an object which in itself is not absolute in character. The stock argument of the Buddhists, that if any composite thing is investigated no whole remains after deduction of the composing parts, e.g. the threads of a mat, is met by the rejoinder, in harmony with the *Nyāya*, that the same result is achieved on the *Nyāya* view, which regards the whole as different from the parts; the whole, in their view, only exists when there is an agglomeration of parts; if, mentally, you take away the parts, naturally the whole, despite its difference from the parts, disappears also. The further hypothesis, that what is really seen is merely atoms without real unity but visible in numbers, though singly invisible, is naturally rejected as devoid of cogency. Finally, the argument is used that the attempt to ask if a whole resides in the parts, as an entirety in each or collectively in all, is mistaken. The whole is impartite, and the idea of its relation to its individual constituents in whole or in part is a question which arises only in respect of the individual elements, and is meaningless as applied to the whole.¹

The value of Kumārila's refutation of the Buddhist schools is not inconsiderable; he brings out fully the grave difficulties which meet any effort to account for the facts of life without accepting some permanent entity, and the objections to the effort to evade this problem by creating the fig-

¹ *Slokavārttika*, pp. 632-34 (vv. 75-83); cf. *Nyāyamānjarī*, p. 550; *Avayāviniśāharaṇa* (*Six Buddhist Nyāya Tracts*, pp. 78-93).

ment of an unending series of ideas, each of which must be supposed to take upon itself in some form the impressions of the whole previous history of the series. He insists, also rightly, on the impossibility of accepting any purely subjective idealism, but he does not seem to have appreciated the possibility of discarding this attitude, but accepting an objective idealism. A suggestion to this effect was implicit in the doctrine of knowledge adduced by Dignāga,¹ which insisted that inference and other mental acts dealt with ideal contents, but Kumārila was able to reply to this doctrine that the whole scheme was meaningless, as it assumed that there was nothing truly real beyond the unreal play of ideas in the mind. No true objective idealism was, therefore, before his mind, and he is content to assert absolutely the reality of an external world, which is not the product of intellect, but which is known by us, the relation of knowledge to reality being of a peculiar and unique type, involving an activity on the part of the cogniser which does not, however, create the object.

In their positive doctrines as to the nature of the universe there are considerable differences between Prabhākara and Kumārila. The former admitted, it is clear,² no fewer than eight categories, while the latter accepted five only. They agreed in regard to substance, quality, action or motion, and generality, but, while Prabhākara accepted the category of inherence from the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, and added the three of potency or capacity (*śakti*), similarity (*sādrśya*), and number (*samkhyā*), Kumārila rejected the three additions of Prabhākara, and also, in this case in agreement with his predecessor, the particularity (*viśeṣa*) of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. Finally, inherence was also rejected by him. On the other hand, the texts ascribe definitely to him the acceptance of the category of non-existence (*abhāva*), with a fourfold division of prior negation, subsequent negation or destruction, absolute nega-

¹ *Śloka-vārttika*, p. 258 (v. 167). The invalidity of all but indeterminate perception is asserted in *Saddarśanasamuccaya*, p. 41.

² *Prameyapārāyana* in Mallinātha *Tārīkarakāṣā*, p. 164; *Mānimeyodaya*, pp. 65, 114 ff; *Prakaraṇapañcikā*, pp. 110, 111 (overlooked in *Prabhākara School*, p. 89).

tion, and mutual negation, sub-divisions which, of course, are simply transferred bodily from the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika doctrine. Non-existence stands in definite opposition to the other four categories accepted by Kumārila; though regarded as real, it is nevertheless admitted to be essentially relative to the four categories of being (*bhāva*). Prabhākara, however, rejects non-existence, as might have been expected from his rejection of non-existence or non-apprehension as a means of proof. The only reality, in his view, in the absence of a pot from a spot of ground is the spot of ground. The particularity of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, which serves to differentiate such things as the ultimate atoms and selves, has no foundation as a separate category, as the differentiation can be based on the ordinary qualities which these things possess.

Substance¹ is that in which qualities reside, and Prabhākara reckons the number as nine: earth, water, air, fire, ether, the self or soul (*ātman*), mind, time, and space. Kumārila is credited with admitting also the substantiality of darkness and sound, while others accept gold as a twelfth. Of these earth, water, air and fire all possess colour and tangibility, and accordingly are the objects of the senses of sight and touch, but only when in non-atomic form, for some degree of magnitude is recognised by Prabhākara, as by the later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, as a necessary condition, along with touch (*sparsa*), of proper sense perception. The other five substances cannot be regarded as perceptible, since they cannot be seen or touched, and therefore are only inferred to exist. In the case of ether the apparent whiteness of it is due to particles of fire in it, while the darkness of night is not a substance, nor is it a quality; if it were a quality it would be perceptible by day also, and therefore must be deemed to be merely absence of light. A variant of this doctrine in the school of Prabhākara declares darkness to be the absence of the knowledge of light. Kumārila claims darkness as a substance, because it is blue in colour and moves, these two facts being necessarily attributed to some

¹ *Prakaranapañcikā*, pp. 24, 54, 77, 84, 141 ff; *Mānameyodaya*, pp. 6 ff, 66 ff, 78 ff; *Śloka-vārttika*, p. 404 (v. 183); *Tārkikurakṣā*, pp. 133, 134.

substance, but the Nyāya denies these facts. Pointing out that a colour can be perceived only in light, and darkness is experienced when there is no light. Śrīdhara again suggests that darkness is the imposition of blue colour on something else. The necessity of inferring ether arises from the nature of sound, which must be provided with a substratum; unlike Kumārila, Prabhākara sees no sufficient ground to give to sound the rank of a distinct substance, a position which has obvious difficulties in a system which allots so pre-eminent a place to the word.

Air, in Prabhākara's view is neither hot nor cold, the apparent heat being due to fire particles, and the coolness to water particles diffused in it. Kumārila also regards it as perceptible, but does not claim that it has any colour; he rejects therefore the Nyāya view that it can only be inferred, colour being necessary to perception, and adopts the later Nyāya opinion which admits of direct perception through the sense of touch. In this and in many other details his school, if not the founder, clearly largely assimilated the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika physics, though it is clear that Kumārila himself was not prepared to accept the atomic theory as absolutely essential to his principles. Some of his followers went further, and claimed that ether, space and time were directly perceptible, but on these points the doctrine of both schools seems never to have been developed.

The account of qualities which inhere in substances, and are distinct from motion, given by both Prabhākara and Kumārila shows obvious obligations to the Vaiśeṣika.¹ Prabhākara gives as objects of perception the qualities of colour, taste, smell, and touch; number, dimension, individuality, conjunction, disjunction, priority and posteriority; pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, and effort, and, like the Vaiśeṣika, distinguishes conjunctions and disjunctions according as they are produced by the action of one or both of the things concerned, or rise mediately through another conjunction or disjunction. Kumārila, like Praśastapāda, enumerates twenty-four qualities: colour, smell, taste,

¹ *Prakaraṇapañcikā*, pp. 54, 151; *Mānameyodaya*, pp. 99-111; *Tārīkharakṣā*, p. 164.

touch; number, individuality, dimension, conjunction, disjunction, priority, posteriority; gravity, fluidity, viscosity; cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, effort, impression (covering velocity, elasticity, and mental impression), tone (*dhvani*), which is a quality of the air, revealing sound, manifestation (*prākāśa*), a quality common to all substances, perceptible and determining them, and potency. Potency is reckoned by Prabhākara as a distinct category; its existence is proved by inference: fire burns normally, but under the influence of some spell it ceases to have that effect; there must, therefore, be something of special character in the fire by virtue of which it burns. Words also have the potency to denote meanings, and so on *ad infinitum*. It is eternal in eternal things, but transient in transient things, coming into being with them and disappearing when they disappear, and thus differing from impression (*samskāra*), which even in eternal things is evanescent. The Nyāya view is sensibly opposed to the recognition of any such conception, since, strictly speaking, the number of potencies in any object might be regarded as very numerous, negating the possibility of accepting potency as one quality or a distinct category of being. Number, which Prabhākara makes a separate category,¹ in the list of Kumārila falls to the rank of a quality. The classification of qualities and their assignment to substances follows generally the classification first given in infinite detail by Praśastapāda. From his list Kumārila departs only in the substitution of tone for sound, and of manifestation and potency for merit and demerit. Unlike Praśastapāda, he denies that cognition is the object of mental perception, though admitting this for the other special qualities of the self. From the school of Prabhākara that of Kumārila differs in asserting that individuality applies both to eternal things and to products, while the former asserts that it applies to eternal things alone. Priority and posteriority apply to both space and time; the later Nyāya wisely rejects both as general qualities, since they are essentially determinations of space and

¹ In *Prakaranapañcīkā*, p. 54, it appears as a quality: impression in its various form is referred to (pp. 80, 81) as inferred only; the full treatment occurred in the missing *Prameyapārāyaṇa* (see *ibid.* p. 111).

time, or, as stated in the *Mānameyodaya*, are special qualities of these entities.

Action¹ as a category covers only, as in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the restricted field of motion, with its traditional five-fold divisions, as throwing up or down, drawing towards or expanding, and motions other than these. But Prabhākara maintains that it is only an object of inference, while Kumārila holds that it is perceived. The argument of the former rests on the fact that, when we think we see motion, we only see conjunction and disjunction with points of space, these contacts subsisting only in outside space and not in the moving thing, in which the activity of motion must reside. The reply of Kumārila's school is that it could only be inferred as the immaterial cause of the conjunction and disjunction of a thing with points in space, which would mean that it must subsist both in space and in the thing, whereas it exists in the thing only. We really see motion, which is in the thing and which brings about conjunction and disjunction in space, a doctrine which has now excellent modern support.

Generality both Prabhākara and Kumārila admit as real and as directly perceptible by the senses, and thus set themselves at variance with the Buddhist denial that there is any such thing as generality. The first Buddhist argument rests on the impossibility of the existence of any whole, which both schools of Mīmāṃsā deny. But further difficulties are raised. If generality is perceptible and is eternal, as claimed in the Mīmāṃsā, the absurdity arises of perpetual perception. Again, how is generality related to the individuals; is it present in its entirety in each?² If so, then there are as many generalities as individuals, and there is mere duplication of names. If not, then it must exist in all collectively, and therefore be entirely unknown, since one can never know all the individuals which make up a generality. If it is eternal, and exists before the individuals,

¹ *Prakiraṇapāñcikā*, pp. 78-81; *Mānameyodaya*, pp. 112, 113; a wider view is taken in *Slokaṭīkā*, p. 707 (v. 74).

² *Prakiraṇapāñcikā*, pp. 17-32; *Slokaṭīkā*, pp. 545-65, 614-39; *Mānameyodaya*, pp. 95-99; cf. *Nyāyamāñjarī*, pp. 297-324; Aśoka, *Sāmañyaduṣanadīkprasāritā* (Six Buddhist Nyāya Tracts, pp. 94-102).

it ought to be knowable by itself, which is plainly absurd; if it comes into being with the individual, how is it distinct from it? The reply given by both these schools is an appeal to consciousness; we have as an actual fact direct perception of generality, and we cannot be induced to disbelieve it by any process of inference, which cannot have the validity of direct preception. To confute our belief it is necessary to adduce some defect in the organs of perception or a subverting cognition, and neither of these processes is possible. The Buddhists would ask us to disbelieve in the existence of colour, but we decline to do so, and equally we find no cogency in their request that we should refuse belief to the evidence of our senses regarding generality. Nor is it correct to ask whether generality is present in its entirety in each individual or collectively in all; these are conceptions which are applicable to individual things alone, not to the impartite generality, which is not to be compared either with a string which holds together a necklace of pearls, or the many parts which go to constitute a single living creature. It is not to be considered as any particular configuration or shape, but is a distinct entity *sui generis*. It must not be thought to be perceptible apart from the individual; such an existence of a separable character, if held by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, is definitely rejected by the Mīmāṃsā. In the ultimate essence, when we analyse our idea of generality, it rests on the fact that, despite differences in things, we recognise in them an essential identity; among cows of many colours and shapes, there is still the same nature. The relation of generality to the individual may be described as that of difference as by Prabhākara, or as different and non-different as in the school of Kumārila, but the view of the two schools is not materially different. Kumārila points out that in ordinary life we recognise things as individual or as generalities, according as we select the one or other of the two aspects which must always be present. The specification of a class is brought about by various causes, such as colour, etc., or time and place. Thus gold is distinguished by its colour from copper, melted butter from oil by its odour and taste, a jar from other articles by its shape, a horse by its neighing, a Brahman by origin,

and in some cases by action also, in places where the duties of the castes are duly supervised by the king. Prabhākara, however, declines to admit of generalities such as Brahmanhood and Kṣatriyahood, which Kumārila accepts.

Prabhākara also differs from Kumārila in his use of the category of inherence as a means of explaining the relation of the individual to the generality. When a new individual of a class comes into being, what is produced is not the existence of the generality, which is eternal, but of the relation of inherence between the individual and the class. Inherence differs from contact in that it does not presuppose the previous existence of the things affected by it, and, unlike the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Prabhākara does not hold that it is necessarily eternal. This affords an easy reply to the question of the fate of the class character on the destruction of an individual; it does not go away, as it has no motion; it does not subsist in the individual, which is no longer in being; it does not cease to exist, for it remains in other individuals, but the inherence between the class and the individual comes to an end. But Kumārila¹ rejects *in toto* the idea of inherence as a true category; a relationship, he argues, can exist only between things which are established as distinct entities, and, as inherence is supposed to be a relation between things which, like the class and the individual, are inseparable, it is a contradiction in terms.

While Kumārila's school admits, as usual, the existence of generalities of substance, quality, and action, Prabhākara declines to accept the last two or a *summum genus* of existence as a real generality, on the ground that, as each generality rests on the fact of actual perception, the genus existence must be disallowed, as we do not in fact perceive things as merely existing. The true sense of existence is merely the individuality of things (*svarūpasattā*); it is not a true class character.

Similarity² as a category is asserted by Prabhākara, who holds that its existence is proved by our consciousness in

¹ *Slokavārttika*, I, 1, 4, vv. 146-55; cf. Aśoka's *Avayavinirāhgrāṇa* (*Six Buddhist Nyāya Tracts*, pp. 78-86).

² *Prakarṇapañcikā*, pp. 110, 111; *Slokavārttika*, pp. 438-41 (vv. 18-23), 565 (vv. 74-77); *Tārṅhikarākṣā*, p. 164.

precisely the same way as every other category. It cannot be held to be substance, for it exists in quality and motion as well as in substance. It cannot, in view of its relation to motion and to quality, be a quality; motion has no qualities, nor can a quality have a quality. It is not generality, for no comprehensive conception of it exists. It is quite other than the relation of inherence. It is not particularity, which in any case is not a true category, since it is no more than the quality of individuality. It must, therefore, be a distinct category, which is perceived in the apprehension of qualities, motions, or parts of two things as common to both. Kumārila's rejection of this category is based on the fact that similarity admits of degrees, e.g. the resemblance of a cow and a buffalo is considerable, that of a cow and a boar is slight; if there were a true category there could be no degrees. He agrees, however, with Prabhākara in regarding similarity as directly perceptible. It consists, in his view, in the fact of the possession by two objects of the same arrangement of parts, and he attributes the erection of a special class of similarity to a misunderstanding by the Vaiśeṣikas of the doctrine of Vindhya-vāsin, which merely asserted that generality consisted in possession of unity of form (*sārūpya*), which was taken to mean likeness (*sādrśya*). The same author is elsewhere¹ cited by Kumārila as denying the doctrine of the existence of the subtle transmigrating body, a view accepted from him by Kumārila, and as enunciating the principle of the genesis of inference, which is accepted also in the *Ślokavārttika*. Who this author was is not apparent; he cannot, it is certain, be Īśvarakṛṣṇa, nor is there any plausibility in identifying him with the Vindhya-vāsa who plays a part in the history of the Sāṃkhya, whether or not he was really Īśvarakṛṣṇa.² He may, of course, have been an older teacher of the Mīmāṃsā school itself.

Cause is not reckoned by either school as a category, a fact significant of the curious failure of Indian

¹ Pp. 704 (v. 62), 393 (v. 143).

² *Sāṃkhya System*, pp. 62, 69. Guṇaratna (*Śaddarśanasamuccaya* p. 104) cites a Śloka of Vindhya-vāsin (!), who was clearly, in his view, not Īśvarakṛṣṇa, but it is hard to say of what value his evidence is, or to whom he refers.

philosophers to find a due place for this issue, even when, as in the case of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, they by no means ignore its importance. But there seems no evidence that either Prabhākara or Kumārila contributed anything of novelty or value to the doctrine. In his discussion of perception, as we have seen, the former makes use of the doctrine of the division of causes into the material or inherent (*samavāyikāraṇa*), and immaterial or non-inherent (*asamavāyī*), a distinction, doubtless, taken from the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika.¹ The denial by Kumārila of the conception of inherence would have precluded him from adopting such a distinction of causes.

Causation, however, affords Kumārila an argument in favour of his thesis of the reality of non-existence.² That entity he classifies as prior, as the non-existence of curd in milk; subsequent or destruction, as the non-existence of milk in curd; mutual, as the non-existence of the horse in the cow and *vice versa*; and absolute, as the non-existence of a horn on the head of the hare. Without the recognition of the first two kinds, he contends, there could be no idea of causation: in its prior negation lies the character of the curd as effect, in its destruction that of the milk as the cause. Everything has two aspects: it regards its self, it exists, as regards anything else it is non-existent; and both these aspects are real and necessary to each other. It is only through this fact that we can say, "There is no jar on the ground," or that we can ever differentiate things, which is possible only on the ground of a real existence of non-existence. It is impossible to perceive this entity, for perception must deal with the existent; the process of intellection is, therefore, purely mental; the ground is seen, the jar remembered, and then ensues the purely mental cognition styled negation, which must be distinguished from inference or any other form of knowledge.

¹ It may be noted that Śālikanātha commented on the *Prastāpādabhāṣya* (Bodleian Catalogue, p. 244).

² *Śloka-vārttika*, pp. 473-92; *Mānameyodaya*, pp. 58-64, 114-18; cf. *Nyāyamāñjarī*, pp. 49-63; *Śaṅkarasāstraṇīya*, pp. 295-98.

IV

GOD, THE SOUL, AND MATTER

• Though the Mīmāṃsā is so deeply concerned with the sacrifice, it has no belief in the doctrine that the rewards of offering are to be expected either from the deities to whom the offerings are directed to be made, or from a God as creator or apportioner of reward and punishment. The sacrifice generates an unseen potency, whence the goods desired by sacrificers are obtained ; the *Vedānta Sūtra* (III, 2, 40) expressly negatives the idea that in Jaimini's view there was divine intervention in this regard, and the atheism of the true Mīmāṃsā is regarded with such unanimity as to render it impossible to explain it away.¹ The full development, however, of the doctrine is, as usual, to be found in Prabhākara and Kumārila, who adopted from the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika the groundwork of their views of the world, but declined to follow that school in its speculations on the existence of a creator.²

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, accepting the doctrine of atoms on the one hand and of the periodical creation and destruction of the world on the other, had found it necessary to introduce the conception of a creator, in order to secure in some measure a mode of bringing about the renewal and destruction of the combinations of the atoms and their connection with souls. But Prabhākara and Kumārila alike deny absolutely the validity of the belief in the periodic creation and dissolution of all things ; they accept a con-

¹ As does Max Müller, *Six Systems*, pp. 275-79 ; cf. K. L. Sarkar, *Tagore Law Lectures*, 1905, p. 508.

² *Prakaraṇapañcikā*, pp. 137-40 ; *Ślokaṣārtīkā*, pp. 639-80 ; *Mānamayodaya*, pp. 70-74 ; cf. *Nyāyamañjarī*, pp. 193-204 ; *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya*, pp. 284 ff.

stant process of becoming and passing away, but they find no ground for the systematisation of the process, so as to produce cycles of evolution and involution of souls. Experience, Prabhākara urges, shows us the bodies of all animals being produced by purely natural means; we can argue hence to the facts of the past and the future, and need invoke no extraneous aid. Moreover, the whole conception of God supervising the merits and demerits of men is idle; God cannot perceive merit or demerit by perception, since they are not perceptible, nor by the mind, which is confined to the body which it occupies. Supervision also is impossible, even had God the necessary knowledge; it must take the form either of contact, which is impossible as merit and demerit being qualities are not subject to contact, or inherence, and plainly a man's qualities cannot inhere in God. If the argument is adduced of the analogy of the carpenter, it may be replied that on this basis the creator would have to be an embodied spirit, and no embodied spirit can affect such subtle things as the atoms or merit and demerit. Nor is it conceivable that the atoms should themselves act under the will of God, for no parallel to such activity is known to us, and, if it were possible, it would follow from the eternity of the will of God that creation would be unceasing. The only true case of supervision known to us is that exercised by the soul over the body, which it occupies by virtue of its merit or demerit, and there is no need to hold that the world is more than an ever-changing sequence of things affected by the souls in it.

Kumārila's treatment includes both an elaborate attack on the whole conception of creation and a special refutation of the Vaiśeṣika views. He ridicules the idea of the existence of Prajāpati before the creation of matter; without a body, how could he feel desire? If he possessed a body, then matter must have existed before his creative activity, and there is no reason to deny then the existence of other bodies. Nor is there any intelligible motive for creation, granted that, when the world exists, conditions are regulated by merit and demerit, originally there was no merit or demerit, and the creation of a world full of misery was inexcusable, for it is idle to argue that a creator could only

produce a world in which there is sin and pain. Yet, if his action is conditioned, he cannot be omnipotent. If, again, it is alleged that the creation was for his amusement, this contradicts the theory that he is perfectly happy, and would involve him in much wearisome toil. Moreover, there is no possibility of establishing the reality of his creative activity. It could only rest on reports of the first of created men, and they could have no power to testify effectively to a state of things existing before they were brought into being. They could only rely on what they were told by the creator, and his assertions might be mere boasting. Nor is it at all satisfactory to accept the belief in the creation of the Veda, which by no means enhances its value; still less to hold that it resides with the creator during the periodic dissolutions of the world, for which, again, there is not a shred of evidence.

Against the Vaiśeṣika view of creation exception is justly taken to the difficulty involved in holding that in some manner the action of the Supreme Lord brings to a stand at one time the potencies of all the souls, and then awakens them all when a new creation is imminent. Against this view it is contended that the activity of men arising from their past deeds can never cease, and it is absurd needlessly to complicate matters by assuming both the force of men's deeds and the intervention of the desire of God. Moreover, it is impossible to explain why this desire should ever arise, and unintelligible to elucidate the mode in which the creator can act without a body or acquire a body.

Kumārila, however, does not content himself with refuting the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika doctrine; he attacks equally the Vedānta,¹ on the simple ground that, if the absolute is, as it is asserted to be, absolutely pure, the world itself should be absolutely pure. Moreover, there could be no creation, for nescience is impossible in such an absolute. If, however, we assume that some other cause starts nescience to activity, then the unity of the absolute disappears. Again, if nescience is natural it is impossible to remove it, for that could be accomplished only by knowledge of the

¹ Cf. *Nyāyamañjarī*, pp. 525-31.

self, which, on the theory of the natural character of nescience, is out of the question. Nor is the Sāṃkhya doctrine of many selves and nature any more tenable as a theory of creation. The beginning of creation is held to be due to a disturbance in the equilibrium of the three constituents which make up nature. But how can such a disturbance take place at a first creation, when there are no potencies due to men's actions demanding fruition? Even at subsequent creations, how do latent potentialities by themselves become fruitful without any consciousness to direct them? And, if they do attain fruition, the Sāṃkhya theory of liberation by knowledge is without value, since the potencies will remain able to come again into activity. Knowledge, it must be recognised, can never give freedom from bondage, which can be attained only by the exhaustion of action, for which the Sāṃkhya metaphysics affords no adequate possibility, owing to the infinite potentiality of nature.

Though the existence of a creator is denied, the Mīmāṃsā accepts without reserve the doctrine of the existence of the self or soul,¹ and Śabarasvāmin elaborates the case for its existence; Prabhākara and Kumārila both develop the theme in close accordance with his views. The necessity of the existence of the self for the Mīmāṃsā rests on its fundamental assumption that the sacrifices are performed to secure, in many cases, a reward not in this life. There must, therefore, be an eternal entity, distinct from the body, the sense organs, and cognitions, which is both the doer of actions and the reaper of their reward. It is not unnaturally objected that there is a strong presumption against claiming eternity for something which suffers change, but the more serious objection is made that men do not realise, when they reap results, the actions which brought these about, thus invalidating the value of the assumed continuity, and that there is nothing unnatural in a man determining to do an act which will lead to evil results in the future, secure in the knowledge that, when

¹ *Mīmāṃsā Sūtra*, pp. 18-24; *Prakaranapañcikā*, pp. 141-60; *Ślokovārttika*, pp. 689-728; *Mānameyodaya*, pp. 78-84.

these results come to fruition, he will not remember their cause. To this Kumārila replies that remembrance has nothing whatever to do with the matter; the wise, who alone are worthy of sacrificing, realise in all their actions the law of retribution, even without remembering the facts of each case. Nor is it any argument against the eternity of the soul that it undergoes modifications; we see in actual experience abundant evidence of changes in man's condition in life without any cessation of the substantial identity, and we treat death as no more than a change through which the soul endures. The sea remains, despite the movements of its waves; the serpent uncoils, without change of essence.

To the theory of the substantial soul the Buddhist at once objects, and proposes instead the doctrine of the series of ideas, each of which gathers from its predecessor the impressions of its unending past. The performer, therefore, it is contended, is the same as the enjoyer, but this contention Kumārila rejects. It is impossible to accept this view, he argues, unless the first idea and the last in the series, from performance to result, have a common substratum. Apart from the fact that, if ideas are really momentary, there can be no interaction and no series, it is impossible on the series theory to find any rational basis for action, since the doer will clearly not reap what he did, and action without rational ground is out of the question among men. Moreover, the exact character of transmigration presents insuperable difficulties on the Buddhist theory. It is impossible for an immaterial idea to move about in a living body, much less to transfer itself from one body to another. The hypothesis of a subtle body which serves as an intermediary between one life and rebirth is denied by Vindhyavāsin, and unsupported by any evidence, nor, if it existed, is it clear how an idea would pass with it. Nor, again, can the existence of an idea in the embryo be explained. The embryo has no sense organs and cannot have cognitions, and an idea is never known to exist save in the form of a cognition. Nor can it be supposed that the idea exists as a latent potentiality in the embryo without a substratum, while, if the sense organs are assumed to be the substratum,

then they would possess intelligence, and rebirth would become impossible, since on their destruction intelligence would go also; further, the share played by the organs in developing the idea would contradict the Buddhist doctrine that the idea arises from a preceding idea only. Nor is there any evidence that the first cognition of the newborn child is due to a previous idea; we hold that it arises from the functioning of the sense organs. There must, therefore, be something which possesses the potentiality of ideas, is eternal, and capable of transmigration. This need is furnished by the soul, which is immaterial and omnipresent, and thus, without motion, is able to connect itself with one body after another.

The soul, then, is essentially active, for, unlike the Vaiśeṣika school, the Mīmāṃsā does not, according to Kumārila, deem that motion is the only form of action, and it is through its superintending activity that the motions of the body are achieved. We must, therefore, conceive the soul engaged from time immemorial in the work of directing a body, the acts done in each life determining the character of the body attained in the next, a process which will cease only, if ever, when the soul ceases to obtain a bodily habitation.

Again, from another point of view the Buddhist conception of a series is imperfect. Granted that it is impossible to establish a soul merely on the ground of such attributes of the soul as pleasure, desire, or memory, adduced by the Vaiśeṣika school as indications of the existence of the soul, since these might be explained on the theory of impressions, no such explanation is available to dispose of the cognition of the self. In the case of the two judgments, "I knew" and "I know," the theory of ideas breaks completely down. The first idea cannot, as past, know the later idea, nor can the later idea know the first. It is useless to appeal to a series, for the series was not present at the first cognition, nor is it present at the last. Nor is there any unity in the two cognitions, for the Buddhist refuses to recognise any classes. Nor can it be argued that similarity would suffice, for in cognitions of different objects, e.g. a horse and a cow, there is no similarity of cognition. The bare fact of each

being in one aspect a cogniser would at most give merely the bare recognition that there was a cogniser, but no personal identity. A true permanent substance is, therefore, essential, and such a substance explains far more effectively than any other hypothesis such phenomena as desire, memory, and pleasure and pain, while it is the indispensable basis of merit and demerit.

This permanent entity is quite distinct from the body, the senses, or cognition. The elements of the body are seen to be without intelligence, and the combination of such elements cannot produce intelligence. If, again, one element alone had this nature, the others could not coalesce with it to form a body. A dead body, which consists of precisely the same material as the living body, contains no intelligence. On the contrary, the fact that a body is an organised whole suggests irresistibly the fact that it serves the purpose of another which directs it, namely, the soul. Such phrases as "I am fat," or "I go," are merely natural transfers of use. On the other hand, the phrase "My body" shows clearly that the ego and the body are different. The same argument can be applied to the case of the sense organs, but others are also available; thus the fact that I feel with my hand what I see with my eyes shows that there is something beyond the sense organs. Again, a blind man remembers what he saw when his eyesight remained, which would be impossible if the organ were the self. More generally the analysis of any cognition reveals to us the fact that the "I" is not the body, nor the sense organs nor the cognition itself, but something over and beyond. Many people can have the same cognition as far as content is concerned, but each cognition has an individual reference, as is seen also with perfect clearness in the facts of memory; if there were no "I", how could we have the fact that one, who has learned half a lesson at one time, can later on resume the task at the place at which he left off? The objection, that the terms "My soul" indicate a difference between the "I" and the soul, is met by holding that in the word "soul" the meaning "cognition" is to be understood, cognition often being inaccurately described as the soul. The result can be confirmed by the evidence

of the Samhitās and Brāhmaṇas, the former of which implicitly, the latter explicitly, recognise the existence of the eternal soul.

There must, however, be something to mediate between the eternal and omnipresent soul and the world, else its knowledge would be eternal and omniscient, as emphatically it is not. The mediator is furnished by mind, whose contact with the soul is the essential condition for its consciousness in all its forms. For this contact it is necessary that mind should, in contrast to soul which is omnipresent, be atomic, and possess the capacity of extremely rapid motion, a fact which makes our experiences, even when truly successive as they are, appear on occasion to be simultaneous. Mind, however, can exist only in a body, which the soul must ensoul, and then through it the soul comes into contact with the outer world by means of the sense organs. Through the contact of external objects with the sense organs, mediated by the mind, the soul appreciates the outer world; the mind directly conveys to it knowledge of pleasure, pain, desire, aversion and effort, which are among its qualities. It possesses further qualities: cognition, which is self cognised in the terminology of Prabhākara or, as Kumārila has it, inferred; merit and demerit, which are inferred; and impression (*samskāra*), which is produced by apprehension and results in memory, from whose operations it is inferred. The principle of impression, moreover, really applies to merit and demerit, for these exist in the form of impressions of past activities, and can hardly be said to be separate qualities, since they merely sum up in terms of moral value the nature of the accumulated impressions; hence, though they appear as distinct elements in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika lists, one list of qualities attributed to Kumārila more logically leaves out merit and demerit. Further, the soul possesses the common qualities of number, namely, unity; individuality; dimension as omnipresent as opposed to atomic, or of the same size as the body as held by the Jains; and conjunction and disjunction with mind. Nothing is more obscure than this relation between the soul and the mind. It is said to be brought about by merit and demerit, but it is obvious

that it is also affected by the activity of the soul, which is never regarded as merely passive in its attitude to mind. The impossibility of expressing the relationship intelligibly is inherent in the effort to bridge the gulf between the material and the immaterial worlds. But it is curious that, as in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, there is no real attempt in the Mīmāṃsā to explain in what way mind is active in the processes of reasoning. It is obvious that inference, and the other means of proof apart from sense perception, must be due to the activity of mind in contact with the soul, but insistence on the part of mind in the direct perception of pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, and effort has apparently resulted in obscuring the essential part which it must be deemed to play in the higher mental activities, if for no other reason than that they all rest, save verbal cognition and negation, on sense perception as an ultimate basis, and even verbal cognition and negation must be mediated to the soul by mind.

The soul, then, with the aid of the mind, is the enjoyer of all experience; the sense organs the instruments; the objects, external or internal, the world and the qualities of the soul; and the body is the abode of the sense organs and the mind, through whose instrumentality the soul has experience. Of bodies Prabhākara recognises three kinds only—womb-born, egg-born and sweat-born—omitting, with some Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika authorities, the vegetable body, on the ground that its possession of sense organs is not established, despite the Jain views on this topic. None but earth bodies are accepted by Prabhākara, though the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika accepts the existence in other worlds of water bodies, fire bodies and air bodies; this excludes the Vedānta view, which finds in the body five or three elements or the variant which admits of four only. The body, however, in any event is essentially subservient to the soul, which acquires a body in accordance with its past deeds; in what manner this is accomplished neither Prabhākara or Kumārila tell us, for in truth the problem is incomprehensible.

So far the views of Prabhākara and Kumārila seem to be in general harmony, but there is a distinct discrepancy, if not a very important one, in their view of the manner in

which the soul is cognised. In the view of Prabhākara the cognition is self-illuminated, but this doctrine is not applicable to the soul. The Vedānta view, of course, insists on the doctrine of self-illumination in the case of the cognition and the soul as consciousness alike; Prabhākara objects that in this case the soul must be present in consciousness during the state of deep sleep no less than during the waking, dreaming and fourth states, and, as all our consciousness can be explained by hypothesis of the self-illumination of cognition, it is needless to assume any other self-luminous object. The Nyāya view, which makes the soul to be the object of direct perception, as opposed to the Vaiśeṣika doctrine of the inferring of the soul, which is also found in older Nyāya, is rejected by Prabhākara on the ground that it serves to make the perceived also the perceiver, which is in his view absurd, a position for which there is clearly much better ground than in the cognate case of the denial of the mental perception of cognition. The theory which he adopts is, then, simply that in every cognition the soul enters into the cognition as a necessary element, and, therefore, in a sense the soul is cognised by the same means of valid cognition as the objects which it knows. But, while the soul is thus cognised, it is not cognised as a true object; it is cognised as the agent in cognition, just as a man who walks is the agent of walking, not the object. The soul, therefore, is the substratum of the self-illuminated cognition, into which it enters in the element of "I," and this fact explains why in deep sleep there is no self-consciousness, since at that time there is no cognition, and the soul can be known only along with a cognition. But the fact that there is no cognition does not mean that there is no soul: consciousness is not, as in the Vedānta, the essence of the soul, but a mere quality of it, and in the state of liberation the soul remains eternally existent, though by ceasing to have cognitions it ceases to be cognised. While this view of the knowledge of the soul in self-consciousness is ingenious and not unhappy, laying as it does due stress on the necessary implication of the self in consciousness, it is a little difficult to see why Prabhākara did not admit that the soul was self-illuminated, which is certainly the natural interpretation of the *Śābarabhāṣya*

(p. 22). That term seems to apply more readily to the soul than to cognitions on his own theory, in which the cognition seems really to be inferred, as it actually is held to be by the school of Kumārila.

How far Kumārila really differs from Prabhākara in these views is not clear. He certainly is credited by such texts as the *Sāstradīpikā* (p. 101) and the *Sarvasiddhānta-saṃgraha* (VIII, 37) with the view that the self is the object of direct perception by the mind, a view ascribed by the *Nyāyamañjarī* (p. 429) to the Aupavarṣas,¹ and this is perhaps a legitimate deduction from the doctrine, which he certainly held, that the existence of the self is established through the notion of "I." The soul he holds to be the substratum of the "I" element in cognition, and this appears to be practically identical with Prabhākara's view that the soul is the substratum of the self-illuminated cognition, and the "I" element in it. Kumārila, however, adopts in the *Tantravārttika*² the doctrine that the soul is pure consciousness, though he distinguishes it from cognition, but this characteristic is hardly more than a verbal deviation from the view of Prabhākara, as far as practical results go.

Prabhākara and Kumārila are agreed as to the fact of there existing a multitude of separate souls, as is the necessary supposition of the Sūtra and the theme of the *Bhāṣya*. The perception of another soul is obviously impossible, but one sees the activities of other bodies, and infers thence that they must be ensouled, just as one's own body is ensouled. Thus, if a pupil has learned half his task in one day, the fact that he continues to learn the next half the next day is a good ground for assuming that he possesses a soul. The same result can be arrived at from the fact that merit and demerit are infinitely various, and not one, as they must be if there were one soul only. The objection that pain is felt as localised, though there is but one soul in the body, is met by insisting that in reality the feeling is in the soul, and it is only the cause of the pain which can be said

¹ Cf. *Mānameyodaya*, p. 80. But in *Śloka-vārttika*, p. 525 (vv. 142, 143), he seems to accept self-illumination from the *Bhāṣya*.

² Trans., p. 516; so *Śloka-vārttika*, p. 187 (v. 167).

to be localised. The further Vedānta contention, that the sun, though one, appears by reflection in different substances to be endowed with diverse qualities, is also rebutted by the observation that the qualities, which appear different, do not really belong to the sun but to the reflecting medium. On this analogy the different qualities appearing in connection with the soul would belong to the bodies which are ensouled, and this conclusion is manifestly contrary to fact, since cognition, etc., are qualities, as we have seen, of soul, not of body. It is characteristic, however, of the tendency to import Vedānta conceptions into the Mīmāṃsā that the *Sarvasiddhānta-saṃgraha* (VIII, 39) asserts categorically that there is one real supreme self, of which the individual selves are unreal differentiations.

Such being the nature of the soul of man, his normal lot is to continue in an unending cycle of lives, each determined from the outset by his actions in previous lives, unless he adopts the path which leads to freedom from this round of existence. The process of this liberation is sketched by Prabhākara; first the man becomes disgusted by the troubles which attend this mortal life; then he realises that even the pleasures of this life are inseparable from pain, both in their attainment and in their disappearance; accordingly he devotes his mind to seeking final release from all worldly things. To this end he abstains from all prohibited acts, which lead to punishment hereafter, and also from all acts which are undertaken for the purpose of attaining some worldly or heavenly guerdon. He also exhausts the accumulated store of his merit and demerit by undergoing the experiences which result thence. Finally he destroys the receptacle of experience by the knowledge of the soul, together with such concomitants as contentment, self-restraint and so forth, all things enjoined by the scriptures to prevent the return of the soul. When all this is accomplished, then the achievement of release is brought about. Prabhākara insists that, as the texts enjoin the knowledge of the soul for no ulterior purpose, it must be understood that the absence of rebirth is the reward of this knowledge. Liberation thus consists in the cessation of the operation of merit or demerit, and in total freedom from the body.

Liberation is purely negative in character; the soul exists as a mere existence without cognition, and without either pleasure or pain, both of which are essentially connected with the presence of the soul in the body. The existence thus achieved is thus like that attained in the view of the Vaiśeṣika, the condition enjoyed by a stone as the author of the *Sarvasiddhāntasaṃgraha* maliciously points out.

Kumārila's views are largely in harmony with those of Prabhākara; thus he holds that liberation cannot be supposed to be bliss in any form, which is essentially transient and unreal. But, consistently with the main aim of the Mīmāṃsā, he cannot admit that the Vedic texts, which seem to connect freedom from return with knowledge of the soul, mean that knowledge produces directly this result. This would conflict with the criticisms urged by him against the Sāṃkhya that they erroneously hold that knowledge by itself can terminate bondage; it is, on the contrary, only possible to counteract the accumulated result of past deeds by working off the consequences; the function of knowledge, therefore, may prevent further accumulation of merit and demerit; it cannot annul what has been accumulated. So Kumārila attaches only an indirect value to knowledge of the self as a factor in sacrificial performance; in the first place, it serves to induce men to undertake sacrifices in cases where they would not else be willing to do so, for they understand the distinction of soul and body and the spiritual advantages of sacrificing. In the second place, through such knowledge men learn to perform the regular offerings, including not merely the fixed offerings but those for special occasions and penances, with the aim merely of avoiding the sin which arises from non-performance, and without any desire for the advantages accruing therefrom. It is agreed that men who do not desire the results of such sacrifices do not obtain them, a doctrine which, of course, is familiar in another application from the *Bhagavadgītā*. Thus, then, by this means the actions of past lives are worked out, while no new action is accumulated, and the man becomes ready for final release in the shape of perpetual freedom from corporeal attachment. The final condition, then, of man will be the persistence of pure consciousness, but

without cognition or feeling of any sort. This view, though in entire harmony with the Mīmāṃsā, has suffered the usual fate at the hands of the later texts,¹ in which it is asserted that the final condition of man is a state of constant bliss.

In what manner then does the performance of sacrifice operate as affecting the soul? The Mīmāṃsā in both schools is confident that there is no question of rewards coming from the deity to whom the offerings are made; no deity is either eternal or omnipresent, and there could be no assurance of it ever receiving the numerous offerings made by diverse votaries, apart from the difficulty of the deity conferring rewards. There must, therefore, be a capacity, which does not exist prior to the sacrificial action, either in the principal performance or in the agent, but which is generated in the course of the performance. Before a man performs a sacrifice, which will lead to heaven, there is an incapacity in the offering and in the man himself to secure that result, but, when he has performed it, he becomes, as a result of the action, endowed with a potency, styled Apūrva, which in the course of time will secure for him the end desired. The existence of this potency is testified to in the scriptures; its necessity is apparent by the means of proof known as presumption. We find in the Veda assertions that sacrifices produce certain results, and, as the operation of the sacrifice, as we see it, is transient, the truth of the scripture would be vitiated if we did not accept the theory of Apūrva. Nor is there anything illogical in the doctrine; every action sets in force activities in substances or agents, and these come to fruition when the necessary auxiliaries are present. The action specified is called into existence by the injunction contained in the form of an optative in a sentence in the Veda.

From this doctrine Prabhākara dissents, elaborating instead a theory which is obviously a refinement on the simple view which Kumārila accepts from the older writers of the school and which best suits the *Mīmāṃsā Sūtra*.² In his opinion the injunction rests in the sentence as a whole,

¹ *Mānasyodaya*, p. 88.

² II, 1, 1 ff; *Prakaraṇapañcikā*, pp. 185 ff; *Tantravārttika*, II, 1, 1-5.

not in the optative verb, and he denies that from the action there arises directly the Apūrva. On the contrary, the process is that the injunctive sentence lays down a mandate, Niyoga; this excites the man to exertion, and this exertion pertains to some form of action, indicated by the verb of the injunctive sentence. The exertion produces in the agent a result (*kārya*) to which also the name of Niyoga is given by Prabhākara, on the ground that it is this which acts as an incentive to the agent to put forth exertion towards the performance of the action denoted by the verb of the injunctive clause. The Niyoga, however, is unable to produce its result, unless aided by something which Śālikanātha styles fate, nor is it apparent that either in his terminology or in his view of the process Prabhākara's doctrine is any superior to that of Kumārila. It seems as if primarily it arose from nothing more important than the observation that the result produced in the agent was in one sense his motive to action as much as the sentence directing the action to be done, leading to a transfer of the term Niyoga, naturally applicable to the sentence, to the condition in the agent to which the more orthodox name of Apūrva was usually applied.

In simple sacrifices there is only one Apūrva produced, but in more complicated sacrifices there may be several, as a rule four. Thus in the new and full moon sacrifices, consisting of two sets of three oblations at new and full moon respectively, there may be distinguished the Aṅgāpūrva, pertaining to the minor acts of the several oblations; the Utpattyapūrva, the result flowing from each of the three oblations in either set; the Samudāyāpūrva, the result of each group of three; and the Phalāpūrva, the result of the whole performance regarded as a unit. But it is not every action which brings about an Apūrva; those actions, which are devoted simply to some material result, though a part of the sacrifice, such as the appointment of priests or the threshing of corn, are not credited with any such effect, as they serve an immediate purpose and need no further explanation.

In the view of both schools there is a clear relation between the injunction and the action of the agent; the former possesses a verbal energy (*sābdī bhāvanā*) in its tendency to produce action by the agent, while the latter puts forth

actual energy (*ārthī bhāvanā*) towards the end indicated in the injunction.¹

It is significant of the theistic tendency of Indian thought that even the Mīmāṃsā was not exempt from transformation. Despite its emphatic denial of the existence of a Supreme Lord, the *Sarvasiddhāntasamgraha* (VIII, 40, 41) treats the end of man as to be obtained by meditation upon, and worship of, the Supreme Spirit which is manifested in each man, and authors, such as Āpadeva and Laugākṣi Bhāskara, declare that if the sacrifice is performed in honour of Govinda or the creator, Īśvara, it leads to the highest good, basing this assertion on the authority of the *Bhagavadgītā*. Hence it is easy to explain the tendency of such works as the *Seśvarāmīmāṃsā* of the polymath Veṅkāteśa, where Vedānta tenets are grafted on the Mīmāṃsā. Guṇaratna, in his comment on the *Ṣaḍḍarśanasamuccaya* (p. 298) similarly attributes to Jaimini acceptance of the Māyā doctrine.

The question, however, arises, how far, in accepting views of the future of the spirit, which are rejected by both Prabhākara and by Kumārila, and in imparting a theistic tinge to the doctrine, later texts relied on earlier authority, now lost to us. It must be remembered that in the *Vedānta Sūtra* there are attributed to Jaimini not merely views in entire harmony with his principles, such as insistence (IV, 1, 17) on the fact that works bear their due fruit without any divine intervention of any kind, but also opinions which show him in the unexpected light of a true Vedāntin, though not of the orthodox doctrine of Śaṅkara. Thus he is credited with the view that the order in which a man must pass through the various stages of life (*āśramas*) is fixed as from lower to higher, and never *vice versā*, and as explaining away as metaphorical the assertion that the highest spirit is a span in size. More precise light is thrown on his doctrine by the fact that he adopted the view of the fate of the soul on departing, by which it is ultimately led by a spirit to Brahman, in the sense that the absolute Brahman is meant, though Śaṅkara argued, apparently against the


¹ *Mīmāṃsānyāyaprakāśa* (ed. Benares) pp. 1-22, 118-25; *Mīmāṃsāparibhāṣā*, pp. 25-30.

intention of the *Vedānta Sūtra* (IV, 3, 7-14) that the reference is to the lower Brahman, the soul passing to the higher state only on the occurrence of the absorption of the lower Brahman. In its final condition the soul possesses, according to Jaimini, all the qualities of the Brahman enumerated in the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* (VIII, 7), together with omnipotence and omniscience, and further possesses a body and senses, having the power of assuming many diverse forms. Though this is not the view of Śaṅkara (IV, 4, 5, 11) it can hardly be imagined that Jaimini really regarded this condition as pertaining to the soul merely preparatory to final absorption in the Brahman; we may rather suppose that on this topic his views were akin to those of Rāmānuja, and perhaps of Bādarāyaṇa himself.

If we were to hold that the Jaimini of the Karma-Mīmāṃsā and the Jaimini of the Vedānta must be regarded as enunciating one body of doctrine, we would be forced to the admission that the later school of Mīmāṃsā departed from the principles of the founder of the doctrine by ignoring the fact that the *Mīmāṃsā Sūtra* represented only one side of his thought. But to accept this would probably be to lay far too much stress on the traditional allocation of doctrines; it is far more plausible to assume that the views expressed in the Mīmāṃsā do not represent one aspect of the thought of an individual sage, but are the expression of the doctrine of a school, which appealed to Jaimini and Bādarāyaṇa only so far as it thought fit to adopt or discuss views of theirs. It would otherwise be altogether too remarkable that of two authorities, who covered much the same ground, we should have preserved the Sūtra of one on the doctrine of action, and the Sūtra of the other on the nature of the absolute, and in both cases the form of the Sūtra is decidedly unfavourable to the view that it is the production of one definite author. The shadowy personalities of Jaimini and Bādarāyaṇa can hardly claim much more effective reality than those of Gautama or Kaṇāda, or even than Kapila himself.

If, on the one hand, there was a tendency to adapt the Mīmāṃsā to theistic or pantheistic views, there was on the other a steady process of degradation of the deities to whom

the offerings were supposed to be made. It can hardly be assumed that these deities were not believed to be real by the founders of the Mīmāṃsā. And there is nothing to show that Jaimini did not accept their existence. But the later doctrine, as evinced in such works as the *Devatāsvarūpavīcāra* of Āpadeva, does not accept the validity of the descriptions of the deities given in the Purāṇas as showing the existence of such beings ; these passages rank as mere Arthavāda ; the deity is merely that to which offering is made, and has no existence beyond the Mantras addressed to it.



V

THE RULES OF RITUAL INTERPRETATION

WE have seen that Prabhākara and Kumārila establish by their elaborate epistemological and metaphysical enquiries precisely the same results as were more simply accepted by Jaimini, the fact that duty or righteousness is inculcated by the Veda in the form of injunctions, which are to be carried out on the strength of the authority of that text as uncreated and eternal. The task of Jaimini, in all save the first Pāda of Adhyāya I, is, therefore, to lay down the principles which will enable men rightly to perform the actions which the Veda enjoins, but which the vast extent of the Vedic literature renders it difficult to determine. The task falls essentially under two great heads; it is necessary to determine precisely to what texts and in what degree authority attaches, and it is requisite to classify systematically the various forms of injunction with reference to the actions which they enjoin. Both duties are performed, though occasionally in somewhat haphazard manner, in the Sūtra; the more important one, the investigation of injunction, forms the main topic of many later works, while the compendia usually cover more or less adequately the whole field. The details of the discussions have necessarily little general value; they deal with incidents of sacrifices, which flourished only in the early days of the history of the Mīmāṃsā, and in many cases the labour devoted to their investigation cannot but seem to us mis-spent. On the other hand, the principles of interpretation developed are often both valuable and interesting as examples of logical analysis.

Of the Vedic texts the Brāhmaṇas afford the immediate material for the extraction of the injunctions which are the

essential part of the Veda, but they contain also passages which cannot be treated as dealing with either positive or negative injunctions, and are classed either as explanatory matter, Arthavāda, or name, Nāmadheya. The Arthavāda (I, 2, 1-30) at first sight seems not to be entitled to authority, but Kumārila and Prabhākara alike defend its validity, the latter against the charge that such sentences are inexpressive, since they are not construed with injunctive verbal forms. The value of the Arthavāda, both hold, lies in it either extolling desirable, or censuring forbidden, acts; it thus comes into immediate connection with injunction or prohibition. Hence it follows that, in cases where it might be possible to extract from an Arthavāda an injunction, it is needless to do so, the passage being adequately explained if it remains eulogistic of some action already enjoined. Arthavādas may be variously divided, but the simplest division is into three classes: the first is where in contradiction of some other means of proof a quality is asserted to exist, as in "The post is the sun," which serves to extol the brilliance of the post. Or it may merely reiterate a truth known otherwise, as in "Agni is a protection from the cold." Or it merely may refer to something which has happened, neither contradicted by other means of proof nor already known.

The case of name (I, 4, 1-16) is far more obscure; discussions regarding it usually turn on one or other of the sentences *udbhīdā yajeta paśukāmaḥ*, "he who desires cattle should sacrifice with the *udbhīd*"; *citrāyā yajeta paśukāmaḥ*, "with the *citrā*"; *agnihotraṃ juhōti*, "he offers the Agnihotra"; and *śyenenābhicaran yajeta*, "he who practices witchcraft should offer the *śyena* sacrifice." It seems at least plausible to suppose that the subdivision owes its creation to the practical necessity of dealing with a limited number of obscure sacrificial terms, but was later extended into a wider area. In the developed theory,¹ the justification of the classification of name is given as follows. Each word in the injunction must be brought into effective

¹ Thibaut, *Arthasaṃgraha*, pp. xii, xiii; *Mīmāṃsānyāyaprakāśa*, pp. 85 ff.

relation to the energy in the agent excited by the injunction. The energy requires a result to be achieved, an instrument wherewith to achieve it, and an indication of the procedure to be followed. The last requisite is furnished by various subsidiary injunctions, the instrument and the object are given by the verb *yajeta* and the qualification *paśukāmah*, which may be reduced to *yāgena paśum bhāvayet*, "he should effect or realise cattle by the use of the sacrifice." It remains to dispose of *udbhidā*, and, various other suggestions as to how it should be taken (e.g. as denoting a spade) being rejected, the conclusion is arrived at that it merely serves to limit the idea expressed by *yāgena*, is only a name, and thus deserves a separate place in the classification of texts.

Distinct from the Brāhmaṇa is the Mantra (I, 2, 31-53) of which no effective definition is attempted in the texts.¹ The Mantras are divided into the Ṛc, Sāman and Yajus, according as they are recited, sung, or muttered, usually in a low tone, though some of the Yajus Mantras, the Nigādas, are said out aloud; the Yajus is usually held to be unmetrical, though with small accuracy. Mantras do not lay down injunctions, but in the main they serve to denote something of value in connection with injunctions, especially the deity to whom offering is to be made. The tendency to find this characteristic is much overdone in the Mīmāṃsā, though even it is compelled to recognise now and then that a Mantra must be regarded as merely of a eulogistic character, or even that it is destined to have some supernatural fruit. The Mīmāṃsā position is, of course, an inevitable result of eliminating the goodwill of the deity as a real factor in the sacrifice; the hymns with which their authors intended to confer pleasure on the gods become a somewhat cumbrous, and not altogether useful, part of the sacrificial apparatus.

Apropos of the Mantras of the Yajus type, however, the Mīmāṃsā develops some sensible rules of construction (II, 1, 46-49), rendered necessary by the fact that, while the metre in the case of the Ṛc and the song in the case of the Sāman determined the extent of the Mantra, the Yajus

¹ *Mīmāṃsābāla prakāśa*, pp. 58-70; *Mīmāṃsāparibhāṣā*, p. 40.

Mantras were recorded in long paragraphs, with no obvious mechanical dividing marks. These principles are that of syntactical unity (*ekavākyatā*); those words must be taken together which, when so united, form a single idea, or, as Prabhākara puts it, to suit his theory of injunction, express a single purpose, and which, taken apart, are not expressive of any idea or purpose. Secondly, there is admitted the principle of syntactical split (*vākyabheda*), which permits us to break up what else might be taken as a single sentence into parts, each of which must contain a single idea. But this expedient is permissible only when there is a clear Vedic injunction to make the split, or when no other construction is really possible, for otherwise the error is committed of multiplying Apūrvas resulting from Mantras. None the less it is a necessary procedure in cases where it is made clear in any way that there are distinct acts to be accompanied by Mantras; "Pleasant I make this seat for thee; sit upon it" (T.B. III, 7, 5, 2) would *primā facie* be one Mantra, but, as it is intended to serve the double purpose of accompanying the act of making the seat for the cake, and setting it down, it must be taken as two. Thirdly, there is the principle of extension (*anuṣaṅga*), which denotes that it is often necessary in the case of Mantras to supply with several sets of words a clause which follows the last of these sets only, and which might thus be deemed to belong to it alone.

Authority, however, is not confined to the Vedic Samhitās and the Brāhmaṇas. It is extended to the Smṛtis, in which term Kumārila¹ includes primarily the Itihāsas, Purāṇas, and the Smṛti of Manu, these being works which claim universal application. The Itihāsas and Purāṇas he deems to contain injunctions based on Vedic authority and much Arthavāda, but he admits that there are also injunctions arising from mere worldly considerations, passages useful only to give pleasure, and other extraneous matter; the hymns to deities serve to secure a transcendental result. They serve as wholes the useful purpose of instructing men

¹ *Tantravārttika*, trans. pp. 25, 112 ff, 244. The Sūtra (I, 3, 1-7, 11-14) never mentions the word Smṛti and the commentators differ widely in their versions.

of very various capacity and knowledge. In the case of the Smṛtis proper only five alternatives are available: either they are completely erroneous, which is impossible, as these works are obviously useful and men are not so foolish as to believe nonsense; or they are due to personal observation, which cannot be accepted; or they rest on tradition, which would give no assurance of validity; or they are deliberately intended to deceive, which is incredible for lack of motive and probability of success; or, finally, they represent lost Vedic tradition. For this decision there can be adduced a certain corroboration in the fact that for certain statements in Smṛtis we can find confirmation in Vedic texts, whence we can assume that other statements were also derived from texts, now unhappily lost to us. Thus part of the Smṛtis is derived from the Veda, part from ordinary motives of life, and the story material is Arthavāda, as in the Itihāsas and Purāṇas. The view of Prabhākara¹ is not essentially different; he also accepts the inference of Vedic authority, but expressly negates it in the case of Smṛtis which do not prescribe or prohibit any course of action, for example, statements that plants have souls, which contradicts his own denial of vegetable bodies. Both schools again agree (I, 3, 15, 16) in accepting as valid the Smṛtis of such authors as Gautama, Vasiṣṭha, Baudhāyana, Āpastamba, Śaṅkha and Hārīta, despite the occurrence in them of passages laying down certain customs as practised by persons in the east, and so on, a fact which apparently contradicts the universality of the Vedic injunction. The decision of the schools is that their injunctions are truly universal, and even the Veda lays down certain practices as to be performed by certain classes only, for instance, the Rājasūya is a sacrifice for kings only.

The Vedāṅgas, or subsidiary treatises bearing on Vedic pronunciation, ritual, grammar, etymology and astronomy, are also admitted to rest in part on Vedic tradition, and the Mīmāṃsā and philosophic treatises generally are permitted to share in Vedic authority; thus Kumārila² assures us that

¹ *Prakaraṇapañcikā*, pp. 100, 101, 150.

² *Ślokaṛtiika*, p. 267 (v. 201).

the Buddhist denial of the external world was not really meant to be taken as a serious contradiction of its reality, but to divert men's minds from undue attention to it, and so with other apparently erroneous tenets. In the case of the ritual Sūtras the claim is made by some that they must be treated as true Veda themselves, but this is denied, for they have human authors, and are merely, like Smṛtis, based on Vedic authority. In the case of grammar, however, a really interesting discussion is raised on the Sūtra (I, 3, 4-30) by those who deny that it can be made out to rest on Vedic authority, and who go so far as to challenge the validity of the claims of the grammarians to be authoritative.

The argument of these unorthodox persons runs: words like *gāvi*, in lieu of the grammarians' *gauḥ*, for cow are perfectly correct; they are fully expressive, they are perceptible by the ear, they are as eternal as any word is, and no beginning in time for them can be traced. The science of grammar, too, has no Vedic connection; it differs in no way from the process of explaining vernacular words for everyday use; it does not deal with actions which are the sole business of the Veda; it serves no useful purposes in relation to duty, as we do not need grammar to tell us the meanings of words; nor is grammar the source of usage, since, on the contrary, it rests upon and follows usage. The reply of the Mīmāṃsā is not convincing; it maintains that synonyms are not permissible, unless enjoined by Vedic use; as *gauḥ* expresses exactly the meaning "cow," any variant of it is wrong and undesirable, and has such power of denotation as it may actually possess, merely because of its similarity to *gauḥ* and not in its own right. The science of grammar also is essential to set out in orderly derivation the vast masses of words in the Vedas; moreover, not usage alone, but usage and grammar determine whether a word has the correct form to convey the meaning, and grammar in the last issue is more authoritative than mere usage. That correct words produce, when used, a transcendental result is proved by the fact that the Veda enjoins their use, and forbids the use of barbarous expressions; moreover, truth leads to supreme bliss, and the use of correct words is truth in speech. Fortunately this disquisition does not prevent either Prabhā-

kara or Kumārila (I, 3, 10) from agreeing that, when the Veda uses a barbarous word, it is to be interpreted in the sense barbarian usage accords to it, in lieu of attempting to foist upon it an etymological sense.¹

The relation of Smṛti authority to the Veda, in cases where there appears to be conflict, is the subject of divergence of opinion between Prabhākara and Kumārila. In the view of the former, which is apparently that of the *Mīmāṃsā Sūtra* (I, 3, 3-4), if a Smṛti contradicts a Vedic passage, the former loses all authority, while, even in the case of Smṛti passages which do not thus offend, it may be impossible to accord their injunctions any spiritual value, if they seem to be due to the avarice of the priests, as when the giving of the cloth from the sacrificial post to a priest is enjoined by Smṛti authority. Kumārila, however, with his greater regard for tradition, reduces, as far as possible, cases of contradiction to mere instances where alternatives are permissible, and only holds that the *Sūtra* recommends in the case of such alternatives the adoption of that which has direct, and not merely inferred, Vedic authority.

Below the Smṛtis in value comes the practice of good men (I, 3, 8-9) or custom (I, 3, 15-23) on the simple ground that, while both must go back to Vedic authority to be valid, the former goes more directly to the fountainhead. In addition, however, to Smṛti and practise must be reckoned as sources of knowledge of duty the implications contained in Vedic texts, which may be deduced by us from them, even if not already set out in Smṛtis or by tradition.

The essential function of all these sources is to give us knowledge of injunctions (*vidhi*), and injunctions are encitements to actions. Actions may be classified in various ways; there is a clear distinction between Vedic and worldly actions, with the former alone is the *Mīmāṃsā* concerned. Actions of this type may be classed as positive, as negative (*pratise-dha*), or as partaking of both characters (*pariyudāsa*), as in

¹ Kumārila enlivens the discussion by giving a long list of errors in grammar committed even by grammarians, and similarly diversifies (I, 3, 7) his exposition of the practice of the good by an account of crimes attributed to gods and sages. On grammar, cf. *Nyāyamañjarī*, pp. 412-26.

the case of a vow not to look at the sun taken by a student. Of actions¹ the sacrificial are the most important, falling under the three main classes of Yāga, the offering to a deity of a substance; Homa, the offering of a substance in fire or water; and Dāna, the waiver of one's ownership of an object in favour of a third party. Sacrifices, again, can be divided according as they serve as archetypes only, like the Agnihotra, or as derivatives (*vikṛti*), like the Māsāgnihotra, or as both, like the victim for Agni and Soma, based on the new and full moon sacrifice and itself a model for the offering at the Soma pressing; or as neither, like the Darvihoma, for special reasons given in the Sūtra. More important is the division by purpose; the Nitya sacrifices must constantly be performed at the due seasons; the Naimittika must be performed on certain special occasions, as the Jyotis offering on the approach of spring, while the Kāmya offerings are optional, being undertaken by a man who desires some special end, as in the case of the Kārīṣṭi performed to obtain rain.

The direction to perform an offering is laid down in an originating injunction (*utpattividhi*) or an injunction of application (*vinīyogavidhi*), according as the matter concerned is a principal or a subordinate offering. In either case, it is frequently necessary to ascertain precisely how many actions are prescribed, and six rules for this purpose are laid down by the Mīmāṃsā (II, 2 and 3). Difference in words is one clear indication, especially in the case of the verb, which is the most important part of a sentence of injunction; the repetition of the verb indicates distinct offerings; the mention of a definite number of oblations is clear evidence; other sources are the difference of names, of materials to be used, and of context. In the case of the last item it is agreed that the occurrence of the same offering in two different recensions of one text, as in the case of the Kāṇva and Mādhyamīna texts of the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*, does not constitute a diversity of context.

The originating injunctions are few in number, relating as they do to the principal Vedic offerings only, such as the

¹ *Mīmāṃsābhāṣya*, pp. 81 ff; *Mīmāṃsāparibhāṣā*, pp. 17 ff.

Agnihotra, the new and full moon sacrifices, the Soma sacrifice, and so forth. It might have been expected that there would have been made some effort to systematise these offerings, but no trace of any attempt to effect this end is seen in the *Mīmāṃsā*, which accepts the sacrifices from the sacrificial tradition. It is true that there is a certain degree of order of progress from the simpler to the more complex, but this order is not absolute, being broken by the necessity of performing the *Naimittika* offerings on the occurrence of the special occasions which evoke them. Nor is there any principle discernible in the rewards attainable by these offerings; they include such material things as wealth, usually in cattle, children, long life, rule, and, most frequently of all, heaven, which is held, on what is known as the *Viśvajit* principle (IV, 3, 10-16), to be the reward promised in any case in which no specific boon is laid down.

The originating injunctions, however, do no more than excite in the mind of the hearer the desire to perform the action which they enjoin, generally in the form of a sacrifice; it remains for other injunctions, those of application, to denote the exact manner of procedure (*itikar-tavyatā*), by specifying the numerous subsidiary actions requisite, and the materials and other necessities for the performance. The discrimination between what is principal and what is subsidiary (*śeṣa*) occupies the greater part of the attention of the *Mīmāṃsā*, and it stands in a close relation to the motive for the performance of the various actions. Actions may be undertaken according to the *Sūtra* (IV, 1, 1 ff), followed by *Śabarasvāmin*, *Prabhākara*, and *Kumārila*, either for the sake of the agent (*puruṣārtha*), or for the sake of the offering (*kratvartha*), while *Pārthasārathi* adds a third class of those which are neither for the one purpose or the other, giving as an instance the *Agnyādhāna*, or piling of the sacred fire. This innovation seems to be without warrant; the original distinction corresponds roughly to that between principal and subordinate actions; the new and full moon offerings serve to benefit man by producing a due reward, while the fore-offerings, which form part of them, are merely subsidiary to the sacrifice; materials normally are subsidiary to the sacrifice,

any good results mentioned being treated as merely Arthavāda, though on occasions a thing like curds, which serves as an element in offerings, may be used to make efficient the sense organs of the sacrificer, and thus to serve for his benefit. The last instance shows that the correspondence between actions for the benefit of the agent and principal actions is by no means complete.

The question of what things can be subsidiary is the subject of an elaborate investigation; according to Bādari's opinion, cited in the *Mīmāṃsā Sūtra* (III, 1, 3), the only subsidiaries are substances, accessories, namely, the Mantras and the deities, and purificatory actions, such as the threshing of corn. To this list Jaimini adds actions or sacrifices generally, results, and agents. The distinction between the two sets, according to the Vṛttikāra, whom Śabarāsvāmin cites, is that the first three classes are essentially in their nature subsidiary, while the latter three are in one sense principal, in another subsidiary. Thus the sacrifices are principal with reference to the materials, but subsidiary to the result; the result is principal with reference to the sacrifice, but subsidiary towards the agent; the agent, again, is principal with regard to the result, but subsidiary to such acts as the measuring of the sacrificial post, which is to be related to his height. From another point of view the agent may be said to be subsidiary to the sacrifices, since it is to perform them that he acts.

Prabhākara¹ divides the subsidiaries into four classes, according to the heads of class (*jāti*), quality, substance, and actions, denoted by verbs (*bhāvārthātma*). The last head he divides into those actions which are directly conducive to the fulfilment of the sacrifice (*saṃnipatyopakāraka*), and those which are more distantly conducive to this result (*ārādupakāraka*). The former he classifies in four divisions; the bringing into existence (*utpatti*) of some object, as the production of dough by kneading the corn; the obtaining (*prāpti*) of a substance already in existence, such as milk; the modification (*vikṛti*) of a substance, as of

¹ *Prakaranopāṇcikā*, pp. 202 ff; cf. *Mīmāṃsānyāyaprakāśa*, pp. 62-67, where the division is twofold, *siddha* and *kriyā*.

ghee by boiling; and the purification (*saṃskṛti*) of substance, such as the sprinkling of water over corn. These actions are all subservient to the sacrifice, and to the Apūrva, which is produced by the sacrifice; they have no distinct Apūrvas of their own. On the other hand, the indirect auxiliaries have Apūrvas of their own, though some, as for instance the drinking of milk by the sacrificer at the Jyotiṣṭoma, have also a seen result. In the case, however, of such a sentence as, "He offers to Tanūnapāt," no effect on the substance offered or the human agent is obvious, and we are bound to assume an Apūrva appertaining to the action by itself, which is subsidiary and auxiliary to the Apūrva of the sacrifice as a whole. But Kumārila, who contents himself with a simpler division of all subsidiaries into the two classes of direct and indirect,¹ goes much further in seeking to recognise subsidiary Apūrvas. He postulates an Apūrva for every injunction, instead of merely for injunctions of principal actions and such others as cannot be disposed of by any other means, and thus, while he does not assert that there is in the directly auxiliary acts themselves an Apūrva, he holds that there is an Apūrva in the fact that a choice has been made of the particular mode of action, e.g. in selecting the mode of thumping as the proper manner of cleansing the grain.

In dealing with injunctions of application there are six means by which the relations of subordination of actions, etc., may be determined (III, 2 and 3). The first and most important indication is express declaration; thus, if the injunction is given to use in honour of the Gārhapatya fire a Mantra to Indra, this declaration (*śruti*) prevails over the normal conclusion that a verse to Indra must come in a ceremony in his honour. Second in importance is indirect implication (*linga*); thus it is a rule in the Soma sacrifice that the juice used is to be consumed; when, therefore, a Mantra (T.S. III, 2, 5, 1) is found which seems merely to refer to the drinking, it must be assumed that it covers by its reference to drinking all the operations connected with that action, such as the taking up of the potion, examining it, drinking it, and digesting it. Thirdly,

¹ *Śāstradīpikā*, pp. 202, 203; *Mīmāṃsāparibhāṣā*, pp. 16 ff.

syntactical connection is of value; thus, in one passage (Ś.B. IV, 4, 6, 16-18) we are able to decide that Ṛc and Yajus mean the *Rgveda* and the *Yajurveda*, and not, as might else be thought, metrical and prose Mantras, because of the syntactical connection with the immediately preceding words. Fourthly, context (*prakaraṇa*) is of great importance; we have the general injunction that one should perform the new and full moon sacrifices, and the injunction to offer to Tanūnapāt; this principle enables us to find a purpose for the latter offering in connection with the former sacrifices; mere syntactical connection would not here help, as the sentences stand apart and are in themselves quite complete. Fifthly, order (*krama*) or position (*sthāna*) is of service; thus in one passage (T.S. I, 6, 2, 4) occur three Mantras without indication of use; we can, however, by finding that elsewhere three offerings are enjoined in connection with these Mantras, assume that the order of the sacrifices and the Mantras is to correspond, one being used with each offering in order. Finally, names (*samākhya*) may supply information else wanting; thus Mantras, not otherwise identified, by being styled *Hautra* are known to fall within the sphere of the *Hotṛ* priest. Each of these means for adequate reasons is deemed to be of more value than the preceding, and in working out the principle in detail the *Mīmāṃsā* shows both skill and acumen, even when we admit that in many cases its reasonings were guided by the fact that a certain usage had become regular, and therefore that the sound conclusion was already given by customary practice.

While these injunctions of application determine the exact mode in which the ceremonies prescribed in the originating injunctions are to be performed, the order of the actions is prescribed by injunctions of performance (*vinīyoga-vidhi*). On this point, however, there is a difference of view between *Prabhākara* and *Kumārila* (V, 1); the latter admits readily the existence of injunctions determining the order of performance by the process of extracting such directions from injunctions of application. *Prabhākara*, however, insists that an injunction of application cannot be deemed to deal with order, which is a matter of indifference,

so long as an act is performed, but even he admits that a few cases occur in which the order of offerings is specially defined. As a rule, however, the order is left to be determined by minor indications. Thus it may be directly enjoined, or the order of the mention of the offerings may be decisive, or the order of the natural actions may be resorted to; thus the gruel must be cooked before the Agnihotra is offered, although the text mentions the latter first. Again, the order of commencement is of importance; in the Vājapeya there are seventeen victims to be immolated; the offerer may begin with any one, but the different acts must be done to each following the initial order adopted. Position, again, is of importance; thus in the Agniṣtoma there are three animal victims, one to Agni and Soma offered on the day before the sacrifice, the Savaniya on the day of the pressing of the Soma, and a barren cow on the final day. In the Sādyaskra, a modification of the Agniṣtoma, the three victims are to be offered on one day, that of the pressing; hence, as this is properly the day of the Savaniya victim, it is to be offered first, followed by that for Agni and Soma, and the barren cow. Lastly, the order of the principal actions prevails over that of subordinate actions; thus at the new moon sacrifice the preliminaries for the offering to Indra are performed before those of the offering to Agni, but the offering to Agni comes before that to Indra: accordingly, in the performance of subsequent rites, it is those connected with Agni that take precedence over those connected with Indra. In cases where none of these means give a clear result, any order may be resorted to, and so with offerings performed independently to obtain worldly goods. Nor is there any fixed order between the Soma sacrifices and the simpler rites known as Iṣṭis.

There remains the question of the right to perform sacrifices, which forms the subject of a set of injunctions relating to qualification (*adhikāravidhi*). Jaimini, it seems, took a generous view of the position of woman, contemplating (VI, 1, 6-8) her as a performer of sacrifices, though, in the case of her being married, both she and her husband must co-operate in offering, and the Vedic Mantras would be recited by him only. Śābarasvāmin already

emphasises the disability of women arising from their ignorance of the Veda, which is not asserted by Jaimini, who doubtless reflects the older usage. Śūdras are excluded (VI, 1, 26, 33) from sacrificing for this very reason of ignorance of the Veda, and in the later texts the admission of women even to a qualified share of the sacrifice is thus anomalous. Some small amount of means is also requisite in a sacrificer, and he must not be incapacitated by disease. Further details are given in the Śrauta Sūtras, which recognise, like Jaimini, the case of certain classes who can take some part in sacrifice though not of the three higher classes, such as the Rathakāra. In the case of Sattras only Brahmans of the Viśvāmitra family studying the same Kalpa Sūtra are qualified to act; all act as sacrificers, and each individually obtains the whole benefit of the sacrifice, instead of it being shared collectively. Moreover, while the death of an ordinary sacrificer destroys the rite, in the case of a Sattra the place of any one incapacitated can be taken by another priest, who, however, obtains no share of the result. Only Brahmans again can eat the remnants of sacrifice, so that, if a Kṣatriya has a Soma sacrifice performed for him, he must be given to drink a substitute for Soma remnants. On the other hand, the threefold duty of sacrifice to the gods, of Vedic study as payment of debts to the Ṛsis, and of the begetting of children as a debt to the Fathers, is incumbent on all these classes, not merely on those who may wish to attain the benefits of these actions (VI, 2, 31). Again he only may perform the Viśvajit (VI, 7) who can afford a fee of 1,200 gold pieces, but, when he is bidden to give up all in it, that applies only to his riches, not to, e.g. his parents, and of his riches there are excluded lands, horses, and slaves in personal attendance, while the 1,000 years of performance is interpreted as so many days.

In addition to these divisions according to content injunctions can be classified on the basis of the knowledge already possessed by the agent of the mode of performance or actions possible.¹ Thus an original injunction (*apūrva-*

¹ Kumāṛila on *Mīmāṃsā Sūtra*, I, 2, 42; *Arthasaṃgraha*, pp. 17, 18; *Mīmāṃsāparibhāṣā*, pp. 10-12, 41.

vidhi) is one which enjoins something otherwise unknown, as when a direction is given that grains are to be washed. A restrictive injunction (*niyamavidhi*) serves to fix as alone valid one out of several possible means of carrying out such an action, such as the husking of grain, which an injunction requires to be performed by pounding. An injunction of limitation or exclusion (*parisamkhyāvidhi*) precludes one of several alternatives which otherwise might be resorted to; thus the injunction, "Five animals among animals with five nails may be eaten," precludes the eating of any animals not having that adornment. In this case the preclusion is implied, in other cases it may be explicit.

While an injunction directs a positive act, a prohibition (*niśedha*) serves to turn a man away from performing the action expressed in the verb and its object. The prohibition does not lead to any desirable result such as heaven; it serves none the less a useful purpose; the man, who obeys the direction not to eat the mysterious Kalañja, by observing this taboo escapes the hell which else had been his fate. In the technical phraseology of the *Mīmāṃsā* the negative applies not to the sense of the verb, but to the optative affix; as an optative urges us to action, so a negated optative turns away from it. In certain cases, however, this normal condition of affairs is precluded, and the negative is immediately connected with the verbal sense. Of these the most important is the case (IV, 1, 3-6) of negative passages headed, "His vows are as follows." The *Brahmacārin* is under an obligation not to look at the sun as a vow; the force of this is not that he is to avoid the evil result of looking, for there is no such result, but, as the context indicates, he is to effect the destruction of evil by the resolution of not-looking at the sun. A similar mode of interpreting an apparent prohibition is seen in the case of the rule, "He should say, 'Ho, we sacrifice,' at the beginning of all sacrificial verses, but not at the *Anuyāja* offerings." The reason for this procedure is that, if the rule were regarded as a prohibition proper, then it would necessarily follow that there was an antecedent rule enjoining the action, since a prohibition implies a previous rule to the opposite effect, and, this being so, the result of the

prohibition would not be what was desired, since, owing to the equal validity of all Vedic sentences, the only result would be to make the action optional. Thus, instead of a prohibition, we have what is technically styled a Paryudāsa, and the sense of the rule is that the words, "Ho, we sacrifice," which are uttered with the śācrificial verses, are to be uttered with those verses only which do not occur in Anuyājas.

These are the main topics, which, with numerous excursions into subsidiary detail, fill Pādas II-IV of Adhyāya I and Adhyāyas II-VI of the *Mīmāṃsā Sūtra*. The next two Adhyāyas deal with the transfer of details from the archetype to sacrifices whose form is derived from it, a discussion rendered necessary by the fact that in the Brāhmaṇas there are many cases in which it is presumed that the details of one offering will be supplied from another, as in the often-quoted case of the Iṣu offering which is based on the Śyena. The transference (*atideśa*) applies not merely to the mode of performance, but to materials and other details.¹ It is regulated by context (*prakaraṇa*) or position; thus the Iṣu offering follows the Śyena model, because they are enjoined in the same context. The rule of position again lays it down that the deity of the original offering is to take the same place in the transferred offering, and the offering material is also to be transferred. Transfer takes place by express injunction, as in the case of the Iṣu offering; by implied injunction, as in the case of the offering to Sūrya, which is based on the new and full moon offerings; by mention of the name of a sacrifice, as in the case of the Māsāgni-hotra, which is made in accordance with the Agnihotra; or by mention of the name of a purification (*samskāra*), as when, the Avabhr̥tha being mentioned at the Varuṇapraghāsa, it is performed like the Avabhr̥tha, or concluding bath, of the Agniṣṭoma where the rite is purificatory.

The process of transfer, however, frequently involves modifications (*ūha*) in the Mantras used to accompany the rites, in order to adapt them to the change of circumstance.

¹ *Prakaraṇapañcikā*, p. 227 (v. 13).

Elaborate rules are accordingly given in Adhyāya IX of the Sūtra on this head. Nor only Mantras are altered, but also Sāmans; thus at the Vaiśyastoma the Kaṇvarathan-tara replaces the original Br̥hat and Rathantara Sāmans. In some cases purifications are modified; thus the wild rice (*nivāra*) used at the Vājapeya offering, in place of the ordinary rice, is subjected to the processes of purification applicable to the latter. In other cases Mantras are not altered, but the number of times of their use is modified.

In other cases the transference must be accompanied by the annulment of details which are now inappropriate. The cases in which this occurs, enumerated in Adhyāya X, are numerous and complicated; thus an act may be changed be rendered useless; in the Prājāpatya rite, based on the new and full moon sacrifices, grains of gold replace rice grains, and the operations of husking and washing are therefore annulled. Again, if Yajus Mantras are given to be recited as Nigadas, which are invitations and therefore must be said aloud, the normal rule of muttering of Yajus Mantras is annulled in favour of the necessary loud utterance. Annulment, again, may be partial or complete, and the later text books take special pleasure in developing the diverse forms in which it may appear. Opposed to annulment is combination (*samuccaya*) in which the new details of the derivative form are only added to the details of the original offering.

In Adhyāya XI the question is raised of the relation of subsidiary to principal offerings as regards repetition of performance. In certain cases a single performance of subsidiaries gives effective aid to more than one principal action, as in the case of the Agnyādhāna, which need only once be performed, the same consecrated fire serving for all subsequent sacrifices; this aid is styled Tantra. On the other hand, some subsidiaries must be repeated with each principal offering; thus the subsidiaries of the rites performed at new and full moon respectively in those offerings are nearly the same, but the lapse of time between the two rites renders the repetition of the subsidiaries essential; this case is styled Āvāpa. But in some cases where a subsidiary is merely performed for the purpose of aiding one

principal operation, it may nonetheless aid also another principal operation; thus the fore-offerings for the victim to Agni and Soma at the Soma sacrifice serve for the cake offering also, and, if an altar has been made ready for a Soma sacrifice, the sacrificer may perform an Iṣṭi with it, if he will. This form is termed *Prasaṅga*.

Finally, in Adhyāya XII the topic of options (*vikalpa*) is disposed of; options are of many kinds,¹ indicated by reasoning, or by direct declaration, or depending on the wish of the agent; nineteen subdivisions of each type are made, of which eight depend on the option furthering the performance of the rite, and eleven on its bringing about some benefit for the agent. By another principle of division options are classed as limited or fixed (*vyavasthita*) and unlimited (*avyavasthita*), each class again being subdivided according as it rests on reasoning or declaration. But options as a rule are open to many objections, though this defect does not apply either to fixed options, or to those which depend on the will of the agent. The subjects to which options may apply are most varied, the use or non-use of certain Mantras, preference for one colour or another, the choice of kinds of grain, mode of action, and so forth.

¹ *Mīmāṃsābāla prakāśa*, p. 152; *Mīmāṃsāparibhāṣā*, pp. 41-44

VI

THE MIMĀMSĀ AND HINDU LAW

* THE fact that the Mīmāṃsā is an investigation of texts in order to evolve an orderly system for their interpretation as a harmonious whole brings it immediately into contact with legal interpretation, and the parallel is made the closer in that the chief object of the Mīmāṃsā is to determine injunctions, which are distinct from those of civil law mainly in the fact that they deal with sacrificial rather than civil obligations, and are enforced by spiritual rather than temporal penalties. Thus as early as the Dharma Sūtras of Vasiṣṭha and Baudhāyana we find that skill in the Mīmāṃsā was considered a qualification for membership of a Paṇḍit, to which the settlement of disputed questions of law was entrusted. The same rule reappears in Manu and in other Dharmaśāstras, and Kullūka at the outset of his commentary on Manu expressly states that he proposes to follow the Mīmāṃsā principles as the appropriate method of interpretation. The first known commentator on Manu whose work has reached us is Medhātithi, who shows himself an adept in the Mīmāṃsā principles, and whose date is most probably to be placed in the ninth or tenth century A.D. The close association of Mīmāṃsā and law is shown in the works of Mādhava who wrote an exposition of the *Parāśara Smṛti*, in those of Dinakara,¹ brother of Kamalākara, who added to his legal treatises the *Bhāṭṭadinakara* on the *Śāstradīpikā*; of his son Viśveśvara or Gāgā Bhaṭṭa, whose *Bhāṭṭacintāmaṇi* deals with the Sūtra; of Kamalākara himself, and of Nilakaṇṭha who shows in his compilation, *Bhagavanta-bhāskara*, an excellent knowledge of the Mīmāṃsā topics.

¹ Cf. Mandlik, *Vyavahāramayūkha*, p. LXXV.

with which his father, Śaṅkara Bhaṭṭa, had dealt. The parallelism, indeed, of the two enquiries only became the more salient as with the course of time the number of Smṛtis and other texts claiming authority increased, and the ideal of reconciling their conflicting views was more and more strongly held. All the devices necessary for such an end existed in the Mīmāṃsā, and we can understand from this reason why it was not thought necessary or desirable to develop a distinct science of legal interpretation.

Thus the essential doctrine of injunction in civil law is based on the principles adopted in the Mīmāṃsā, and in the interpretation of the various kinds of injunction the civil law adapts to its own special needs the maxims of the sacred law. The distinction between injunction proper and a restrictive injunction (*niyama*) is applied in the sense that the latter is reduced to nothing more than a maxim or rule, which ought to be regarded, but which, if violated, does not render the action affected invalid; thus Manu's rule as to marrying an amiable and healthy girl is not an injunction, the violation of which renders void the marriage, but a counsel of prudence. The case of an injunction of limitation (*parisamkhyā*) raises difficulties, as there arises in regard to it the question whether or not it is to be deemed to imply a prohibition; thus, when the injunction is laid down that the sons may divide the family property on the death of their parents, Jīmūtavāhana puts the question whether it is to be inferred that they may do so only on the death of their parents, a view which he rejects.

Negative injunctions also raise a point of legal importance in the relation of prohibition proper, and a mere exception (*paryudāsa*). Thus the general law of the succession of a son and other heirs is subject to the exclusion from succession of persons impotent, outcaste, lame, blind, and suffering from incurable diseases, who are entitled to maintenance merely. The negation in their case is essentially to be treated as an exception to the general rule of succession; it, therefore, applies only to persons so circumstanced at the moment when the succession would normally vest, and, therefore, if successors become so afflicted after becoming entitled to the succession, the rule does not in any

way affect them, as, of course, it would do if it were a prohibition proper.¹

In the interpretation of the Smṛti injunctions the same principles are applicable as in the case of the interpretation of the injunctions of application in Vedic texts. Thus the express declaration of a text must be held to override any conclusion which might be deduced from it by suggestion (*lakṣaṇā*), corresponding to *līṅga* in Jaimini. The declaration of Manu (IX, 104) that "after the death of father and mother the sons should divide the paternal property, for they have no power over it while their parents live," is an absolute declaration that they have no such power; it is impossible to read the rule as forbidding partition during the parents' life, but acknowledging the power of the sons over the property. The power of suggestion, however, has also its own place; thus Nanda Paṇḍita in explaining how, although the word "substitute" was first applied specifically to five kinds of sons, it becomes applicable to all the twelve kinds legally recognised, adduces the Prāṇabhṛt maxim (I, 4, 28) as his warrant. Prāṇabhṛt originally denotes a Mantra used in consecrating a brick in the fire altar; thence it passes to be the name of the brick, and from denoting the special bricks used applies more generally to any brick. The principle of syntactical connection (*vākya*) reappears, usually under the title Anvaya; its superiority to context (*prakaraṇa*) is illustrated by Raghunandana's discussion of Manu's rule (XI, 209) that one who assaults a Brahman must undergo the Kṛcchra penance. If the context is invoked, this may seem merely to refer to the case of the new and full moon sacrifices, and therefore has no general or civil application, but the sound view is that it is to be treated as a single independent proposition.

The term, Arthavāda, which plays so important a part in the Mīmāṃsā discussions is dropped in legal terminology, but the legal texts recognise the existence of such passages in the Smṛtis and deal variously with them. One difficult problem is handled in the light of the maxim of Jaimini (I, 2, 19-25), dealing with declarations which have the

¹ Tagore Law Lectures, 1905, pp. 332, 333.

appearance of being injunctions but are not really so (*vidhivannigadādhikarāṇa*). Thus Jīmūtavāhana¹ is enabled to hold that the text which provides that, "Though immovables or bipeds have been acquired by a man, no gift or sale of them without the assent of his sons," is to be completed by the words, "should be made," and not by the words "must be made." This interpretation reduces the sentence to a mere pious opinion, and avoids contradiction with the well-known injunction, which allows a man absolute power of disposal over property acquired by his own exertions, as opposed to ancestral possessions. The same maxim, however, has been interpreted as supporting the general rule that an injunction for which a reason is adduced is merely equivalent to an Arthavāda, so that Vasiṣṭha's rule against the adoption of an only son is reduced to a pious expression of opinion, because it is followed by the explanation that a son is one who saves from hell his natural father, a fact which makes the adoption of an only son undesirable. The Mīmāṃsā rule, however, goes no further than to hold that, if for a rule which has no known Vedic sanction a selfish motive can be seen, it is impossible to postulate for it the authority of a Vedic text, and the supposed rule of law is clearly too widely stated.

The obligation of law to the Mīmāṃsā extends to every department of the topic, and it not merely in matters of interpretation that the legal writers borrow matter from the Mīmāṃsā, but they show repeatedly traces of influence by the positive doctrines of that school in their bearing on the religious aspect of property and family rights. The doctrine of the three debts of man, sacrifice to the gods, study to the Rṣis, and the begetting of a son for the Fathers, enunciated by Jaimini, affords three presumptions which, more or less effectively, are taken into account by the schools of law. In treating the principle of succession Jīmūtavāhana uses, as a guiding principle in reconciling the conflicting statements of the Smṛtis, the principle of securing as far as possible spiritual welfare, and in interpreting the rules regarding

¹ *Dāyabhāga*, trans. Colebrooke, II, 29, 30.

self acquisition of property he tacitly favours the claims of Vedic study. Vijñāneśvara, on the other hand, in his treatment of the right of succession accepts the guidance of the importance of maintaining the institution of the family. It is significant that in treating of the fundamental text of Gautama on ownership as derived from inheritance, purchase, partition, seizure, or finding, both Jimūtavāhana and Vijñāneśvara appeal to the Mīmāṃsā in support of tenets which are essentially at variance. The view of the former accepts the doctrine that in all these modes of acquisition there is more than mere physical acquisition concerned; the attaining possession must be in furtherance of duty in the widest sense. This view he supports by the doctrine that, when the priest becomes possessed of the remnant of the sacrifice, he does so not by the mere act of acceptance, but in virtue of the pious intention of the donor in dedicating the offerings to the deity. Thus for him succession becomes a matter of spiritual benefit, and the property comes to the heir not in virtue of his acquisition of it, but by a species of relinquishment by his ancestor, a principle upon which, it has ingeniously been suggested, the lawyers of Bengal might easily have built a doctrine permitting of the limited settlement of family property. Vijñāneśvara,¹ on the other hand, following a suggestion of Prabhākara, argues that Jaimini (IV, 1, 3-6) was of opinion that property was essentially a matter of popular recognition, and that the acquisition of property by an action in breach of law did not deprive the sacrifices made by means of it of full efficacy. Hence Vijñāneśvara's doctrine of succession rests on blood kinship, and heritage is defined by him as wealth that becomes the property of another solely by reason of relationship to the owner. Similarly the *Vyavahāramayūkha* (p. 32), in accepting the purely secular origin of property, nonetheless appeals to the Mīmāṃsā treatment (VI, 7, 1, 2) of the Viśvajit offering in order to show that one's children are not included in the term "property," for when at that offering the sacrificer is supposed to give away to the priests

¹ On Yājñavalkya, II, 114; he cites Guru (p. 108, ed. Bombay, 1909), and the passage is found in the *Bṛhatī* (Prabhākara School, p. 312).

his all, his children are excluded from the gift. The same passage is also employed to express the limited character of the ownership of a king or a feudatory; his actual ownership is restricted to whatever property he has acquired; his position towards the territory is one of sovereignty or suzerainty, entitling him to a maintenance but not to true ownership; when a king is said to give a village, he does not transfer the ownership of the land, which is not his to give, but assigns to the donee the right of drawing a maintenance from the village.

The Mīmāṃsā also affords guidance to Vijñāneśvara (II, 136) in a variety of details in connection with heritage and partition. The claim of woman to inherit is questioned on the ground that, as property is intended for sacrificial purposes and as save along with her husband a woman has no *locus standi* as a sacrificer, on the interpretation of the *Mīmāṃsā Sūtra* (VI, 1, 17-21) adopted in the commentators, there is no ground for her having the right of inheritance. This illiberal doctrine is disposed of by appeal to another passage of the *Mīmāṃsā Sūtra* (III, 4, 26) in which it refers to ornaments of gold worn by the priests and the sacrificer, though serving no sacrificial purpose. The exact share of a wife raises difficulties in view of the conflicting interpretation of the two main texts, the first of which provides that, if an owner divides property in his lifetime, he should make his wives have equal shares with his sons; and the second, that on partition after the death of the husband the wife should have a share equal to that of her sons. These passages are interpreted by some authorities to mean that, if the property is extensive, she is to have a mere subsistence from the estate, while, if it is small, she is to have an equal share. This view is rejected on the strength of the principle upheld by Jaimini (VII, 3, 19-25) that, so long as a text can yield a single coherent meaning, it is not right to treat it as broken into two incongruous parts. Similarly it is on the Mīmāṃsā rule (V, 1, 4-7) of following the order of things mentioned in a certain order that is based the claim that, when the parents of a childless son succeed to his property, the mother has a prior claim, because the term parents (*pitarau*) is explained in grammatical treatises

as mother and father (*mātāpitarau*), and not as father and mother. Another appeal to the Mīmāṃsā doctrine is made in regard to Yājñavalkya's doctrine (II, 126) that a coparcener, who at the time of partition withholds part of the property, must give it up for division. The question arises whether the action is reprehensible or not, and is decided in the affirmative because in the Mīmāṃsā (VI, 3, 20) it is ruled that a man who substitutes one form of meal for another, even if acting under a genuine misapprehension, still does wrong, so that, even if the coparcener had some right to the property and regarded it as his own, his conduct is censurable. Jimūtavāhana, as often, differs in part from Vijñāneśvara, and extenuates the action. On a strict interpretation by Mīmāṃsā principles again, it is not impossible to argue that Jimūtavāhana does not allow the disposal by will by a father of inherited property without provision being made for the maintenance of the sons; the conflicting view of the Privy Council is clearly hard to reconcile with the principles of Mīmāṃsā.¹

Adoption, like inheritance, affords a fruitful field for the application of Mīmāṃsā principles.² The right of a Śūdra to adopt, which is denied in the *Śuddhiviveka*, on the ground that adoption must be accompanied by Vedic Mantras and an oblation which he cannot as a Śūdra have performed, is vindicated on the ground of the occurrence of a certain offering for a Niṣādasthapati (VI, 1, 51) in the Veda, although a Niṣāda is normally as a Śūdra excluded from any Vedic rite. The Mantras can then be recited by an Aryan. A woman, again, can only adopt with the permission of her husband, as she cannot by herself perform Vedic rites and ceremonies (VI, 1, 6). Again, a child when adopted cannot inherit his father's property or perform his Śrāddha, according to Manu; this rule, though restricted to these two facts, must be understood to apply generally on the analogy of terms like *antarvedi* in the Mīmāṃsā (III, 7, 13, 14), which means not merely at the centre of the altar, but anywhere within it. By another maxim Nīlakaṇṭha decides that

¹ *Tagore Law Lectures*, 1905, pp. 405-11.

² *Vyavahāramayūkha* (ed. Bombay, 1880), pp. 40 ff.

Śaunaka's text, which asserts that the son of a daughter and the son of a sister are adopted by Śūdras, is to be read to mean that these adoptions are generally permissible, and that they are specially so in the case of Śūdras: the maxim used is the *Maitrāvaruṇa*, which rests on the interpretation of the two sentences, "He hands over a staff to the *Maitrāvaruṇa* priest; he initiates or invokes by means of the staff." The accepted opinion is that the handing over of the staff is a distinct injunction, the initiation or invocation subsidiary, and so here the part of the Śūdra is only subsidiary to an established rule. Śaṅkara Bhaṭṭa, his father, whom Nilakanṭha cites, expressly applies to the Śūdra the duty of paying his debt to the Fathers, which is asserted of the Brahman as an instance in the *Mīmāṃsā Sūtra*.

Similar use of the *Mīmāṃsā* is made in the same connection by Nanda Paṇḍita in the *Dattakamīmāṃsā* (c. 1600 A.D.). Thus on the analogy of the *Vaiśvadeva*, which is a maxim (I, 4, 13-16) laying down that in the case of such a word as that the conventional sense is to be followed in lieu of the etymological, he holds (VI, 27) that the term *sapinda* used of relationship is not to be restricted to the exact meaning suggested by the word as a compound. So also, in order to meet the objection of Medhātithi to an adopted son on the ground that the duty of man is fulfilled only by begetting a son, he adduces (I, 41) the maxim (VI, 3, 31) of the substitution of the *Pūtika* for the *Soma* plant. In determining the value of substitution the mode in which the substitute originated is unimportant, the question is whether it can serve its purpose adequately, and this an adopted son can easily do. Again, the objection to the rule that an adoptive father must perform the birth ceremony for an adopted child, though adoption is permitted up to the fifth year, is met by the use of the maxim (V, 4, 5-14) that, when a difficulty arises as to the order of performance of offerings, reason and necessity must be consulted, whence it follows that the performance of the birth ceremony is in order though tardy. The author of the *Dattakacandrikā* similarly appeals to the *Mīmāṃsā* doctrine (IV, 1, 22-24) of the relation of the principal and incidental aspects of an action, in order to support his view that, if one of two co-widows adopt, the

child becomes the adopted child of the other as well. As the principal purpose of the action is to provide offspring for the dead husband, the result of doing so is that the son occupies the same position to either widow, this being a mere incidental matter. The same text elsewhere cites the Kapiñjala maxim (XI, 1, 38-45) which indicates that, when the plural number is used in any injunction, in the absence of necessity requiring that a larger number should be deemed to be meant, the needs of the situation are fully met by restricting the number to three, the minimum indicated.

The sacrificial practice yields one obvious contribution to the law of partnership, such as those of trading companies, bodies of actors, and agricultural concerns. The rule is laid down that the returns are to be divided among the partners according to the amounts of their respective investments, on the analogy of the distribution of the sacrificial fees among the officiating priests (X, 3, 53-55). Thus, of one hundred cows twelve are given to each of the four principal priests, six to the next four, four each to the next four, and three each to the last group, the amounts being allocated in accordance with the comparative importance of their contribution to the carrying out of the offering.

In the domain of quasi-criminal law Raghunandana solves a difficulty by the application of the analogy of the principle of Tantra, where a single performance of an action serves the purpose of more than one principal offering. The problem is raised in the case of the rule that the assailant of a Brahman must perform the Kṛcchra penance on pain of punishment; if, then, one offends against five Brahmans, is the penance to be performed five times? The answer on the Tantra principle is in the negative. Medhātithi again has recourse to the Mīmāṃsā maxim of Grahaikatva (III, 1, 13-15) which holds that in a general injunction the singular includes the plural and the masculine the feminine, in order to solve the doubt raised by the rule of Manu (V, 90) that a Brahman must not drink spirituous liquor, an ingenious objector having suggested that the text is restricted in its application to such action by a single male Brahman. The maxim, it will be seen, differs entirely in its effect from that given above, which in sacrifices and on

other occasions reduces a plural to its bare meaning of three.

Even more interesting is a case in which the law of evidence is influenced by the Mīmāṃsā doctrine of the self validity of cognitions. Yājñavalkya lays down (II, 80) that, if a man has brought forward witnesses, yet if at a later period he can produce more satisfactory testimony, the evidence already adduced is to be discredited. This procedure, at first sight drastic, is justified by the adduction in the *Mitākṣarā* of the arguments adduced by the Vṛttikāra in support of the self-evidence of cognitions. Evidence is *prima facie* valid, unless it can be shown that the witness could not have known the facts, that his means of knowledge were defective (*kāraṇadoṣa*), or his evidence is displaced by other evidence, that is, the first cognition is sublated by a second cognition. Immediately after, Vijnāneśvara (II, 83) has recourse to the Mīmāṃsā to provide a suitable penance for the witness whom he enjoins to withhold evidence or testimony, where the proof of the charge would result in the infliction of the capital penalty; in these cases the usual punishment of a fine, or in the case of a Brahman banishment, is not in point; still, to do away with the sin of the deviation from the truth the performance of a special offering, the Sārasvateṣṭi, given in the Mīmāṃsā, is prescribed.

As is natural, the obligations of the law books to the Mīmāṃsā principles are still more marked in those parts of those treatises which deal, not with civil law (*vyavahāra*) in the narrower sense of the term, but with religious custom and penances. Even in the civil law, however, there is one point on which the law books differ in essentials from Jaimini; it was necessary for the latter, in support of his doctrine of the eternity of the Veda, to maintain that its commands are universal, and thus he treats even Smṛti texts which contain injunctions expressed as local practises as really laying down general principles. In the practical needs of the law, however, the utmost value is always attached to local customs, and the practice of good men, which thus in effect comes to outweigh maxims in Smṛtis, if in any place these are not followed. Yet

Jaimini's insistence on the supreme value of the Veda in all questions was not without effect; the tendency in the Smṛtis is, in harmony no doubt with a common practice, to allot in the case of partition of property a larger share to the eldest son than to the others. But there is Vedic authority for the statement that Manu divided his property in equal shares among his sons, and this doctrine has finally prevailed in the law, despite the efforts of some of the compilers of digests to compromise the matter in order to obey the clear directions of the Smṛtis.¹ In the legal schools, again, it has been found necessary to assign relative weight to Purāṇas and Smṛtis, a distinction which is not found in Kumārila, who accepts the Purāṇas on the same basis as the Smṛtis. In the case of a divergence between Smṛti and Purāṇa the former should prevail in the view of Vyāsa; the Purāṇa represents no more than custom, while the Smṛti is a step nearer to Śruti.²

While the Mīmāṃsā thus stands in close relation with Indian law, in its enunciation of principles in the form of brief maxims (*nyāya*), comparable with the headnotes of modern law reports, it stands in equally close relation with the popular vogue of maxims³ framed on the model whence the Mīmāṃsā use is doubtless derived. Such popular maxims are freely cited by the text-books of the school, and it was presumably on their analogy that the Adhikaraṇa headings were derived; the remarkable divergence of the commentators⁴ in allotting Sūtras to Adhikaraṇas indicates that the latter were not a primitive constituent of the Sūtra text.

¹ Cf. Mandlik, trans. of *Vyavahāramayūkha*, p. 41, n. 1.

² *Tagore Law Lectures*, 1905, pp. 234, 235; cf., however, Mandlik, *op. cit.* p. xxx.

³ See Col. Jacob's *Lankikanyāyāñjali* (2nd ed., 3 parts).

⁴ Above pp. 4, 13. So in the *Vedānta Sūtra*.

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